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CONSTITUTIONAL IRONY:
GONZALES V. RAICH, FEDERALISM AND

CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF INTRASTATE
ACTIVITIES UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

Steven K. Balman*
[T]he candidcitizen must confess that ifthe policy of the government, upon vital questions
affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocablyfixed by decisions of the Supreme Court,
the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the
people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practicallyresigned
their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.

Abraham Lincoln

[lit is not clear why one should take pride in the Court'sfailures in Commerce Clause
cases, or in theirfrequency ....

Alexander Bickel
I.

2

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court currently divides its Commerce Clause cases
into three categories: (1) cases involving the "channels of interstate commerce"; 3 (2)
cases involving the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in
interstate commerce"; 4 and (3) cases involving "activities that substantially affect
5
interstate commerce.
The first two categories-the "channels" cases and the "instrumentalities" casesare not controversial and, by and large, do not present difficulties. The third categorythe "substantial effect" cases-are very controversial. In those cases Congress uses its

* Member, Bar of the State of Oklahoma; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law;
A.B., Harvard University (1978); J.D., University of Texas (1981).
1 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (D.C., Mar. 4, 1861), in Abraham Lincoln: Complete
Works: Speeches and Letters vol. 2, at 1, 5 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., Century Co. 1894).
2. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 231
(Bobbs-Merrill 1962).
3. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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commerce power to regulate intrastateas opposed to interstate commerce.
. The intrastate Commerce Clause cases are controversial because they involve
federal regulation of subject matter (e.g., criminal law) and geographical territories that
are traditionally regulated by the states. Since 1942, the Court has, for the most part,
acquiesced in these Congressional invasions of areas traditionally regulated by states.8
7
The opinions that justify and explain the incursions employ paradoxical, even ironic,
interpretations of the Commerce Clause. In any given intrastate case, the Court may use
one or more of the following interpretations of the express language in the Commerce
Clause:
(1) Interstate Paradox: Even though the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to
regulate commerce among the states-interstate commerce-Congress can
regulate intrastate commerce-commerce that is confined to, or occurs within, a
single state. "Interstate" means "intrastate."
(2) Commerce Paradox: Even though the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress
to regulate commerce, the commerce power extends to noncommercial,
noneconomic activities. The commerce power is about power, not commerce.
The commerce power is a plenary, national "police power."
(3) Substantial Paradox: Even though cases hold that intrastate conduct that has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce can be regulated, Congress can
regulate conduct with a trivial and inconsequential effect on interstate
commerce. "Substantial" means "trivial."
The three Commerce Clause paradoxes are a form of constitutional irony.
A question immediately arises: Is constitutional irony good or bad? This article answers
that question by examining Gonzales v. Raich9-a case decided June 6, 2005, by a vote

6. Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw vol. 1, § 5-5, 825-28 (3d ed., Found. Press 2000).
7. "Paradox," as used herein, means "a statement that is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common
sense ....
" Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 842 (10th ed., Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1999); see
A Companion to Epistemology 324 (Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa eds., Blackwell 1992).
8. "Ironic" refers to "irony," i.e., the "use of words to express something other than and [especially] the
opposite of the literal meaning." Id. at 619. As a matter of rhetorical theory, irony is a trope-a "deviation
from the ordinary and principal signification of a word." Edward P. J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the
Modern Student 426 (3d ed., Oxford 1990). "Irony" is the "use of a word in such a way as to convey a
meaning opposite the literal meaning of the word." Id. at 454. An example can be found in William
Shakespeare's play Julius Caesar, in which Mark Antony in his "Friends, Romans, Countrymen" speech
comments that "Brutus is an honourableman." Id. (emphasis in original); see generally The New Cambridge
Shakespeare: Julius Caesar 109 (Marvin Spevack ed., Cambridge U. Press 1988). Irony is "fashioned of
falsehood by dint of a reflection which wears the mask of truth." Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric 440
(Clarendon Press 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). This article is a critique of the accounts of the Commerce Clause and
federalism in the orthodox liberal constitutional theory taught in most law school Constitutional Law courses
(i.e., "Living Constitution" theory). On many points, this article follows the analysis of Professor Randy E.
Barnett in Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton U. Press 2004), and
Professor Richard A. Epstein in How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution (Cato Inst. 2006). Professor
Barnett was counsel for the respondents in Raich. Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2198. Professor Epstein worked with
the Institute for Justice in preparing an amicus brief in support of Raich. Br. Amicus Curiae of Inst. for Just. in
Support of Respt., Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195. In this article, the libertarian and classical liberal views held by
Professors Barnett and Epstein, respectively, are balanced against and moderated by the conservative views of
George F. Will, set forth in Statecraftas Soulcrafi: What Government Does (Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1983), and
Abraham Lincoln: Complete Works: Speeches and Letters, supra n. 1,and by the neo-Burkean views of
Professor Bickel, supra n. 2. Although Richard Rorty is mentioned, this article does not address the views of
postmodern jurisprudence. After the Sokal Affair and 9/11, postmodemism is dead. See e.g. Editors of Lingua
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of six to three. Raich involved all three Commerce Clause paradoxes. The thesis of this
article is that constitutional irony is bad-very bad.
In Gonzales v. Raich, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a federal statute used to
regulate a wholly intrastate activity-the cultivation and use of medical marijuana by
two California women. 10 The amount of marijuana involved was trivial; there were no
sales, trades, or exchanges.'' The federal statute was held to be a valid exercise of
Congress's commerce power 12-a power granted by the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. In permitting the Congressional regulation of an intrastate activity,
the Court followed a 1942 decision of the "Roosevelt Justices"-the Justices that
President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed after the Constitutional Revolution of 1937.
That decision, Wickard v. Filburn,13 upheld a New Deal statute that regulated the
amount of wheat a farmer could produce for personal use-household consumption and
chicken feed. 14 Wickard represented the "outer limits of federal power.", 15 Like Raich,
Wickard involved all three Commerce Clause paradoxes.
Gonzales v. Raich represents a great leap backward in Commerce Clause doctrine
and the jurisprudence of federalism. Raich casts doubt on two recent decisions of the
Rehnquist Court-United States v. Lopez 16 and United States v. Morrison 7-that

suggested the commerce power had limits and read the Commerce Clause in a common
sense, non-ironic way. Significantly, Lopez and Morrison made only limited use of the
Commerce Clause paradoxes.

Franca,The Sokal Hoax: The Sham That Shook the Academy 91-104 (U. Neb. Press 2000); Ophelia Benson &
Jeremy Stangroom, Why Truth Matters 62 (Continuum 2006); Samuel R. Smith, Postmodernism is Dead: Now
What? http://www.intelligentagent.com/archive/Vol3 Nol poliscismith.html (accessed July 13, 2006).
10. Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2199-200.
dissenting).
11. Id. at 2200, 2200 n. 8, 2207-09 (majority); id. at 2229 (O'Connor,J.,
12. Id. at2205-09.
13. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
14. Id.
15. Douglas W. Kmiec, Gonzales v. Raich: Wickard v. Filbum Displaced,in Cato Supreme Court Review,
2004-2005, at 71, 72, 72 n. 10 (Mark K. Moiler ed., Cato Inst. 2005) (citing U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560
(1995), as characterizing Wickard as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority
over intrastate activity"); see Bamett, supra n. 9, at ix (commenting that Wickard drained the Commerce
Clause of its meaning), 315 (arguing Wickard destroyed the distinction between interstate and intrastate
commerce); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The PoliticalSeduction of the Law 56 (Free Press
1990); Erwin Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalLaw: Principles and Policies 252, 254-55 (2d ed., Aspen 2002);
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century, 1888-1986, at 238 (U. Chi.
Press 1990); Epstein, supra n. 9, at 74 ("The language of the [Commerce Clause] is contorted so 'commerce'
now includes.., its verbal opposite."); Charles Fried, Saying What the Law Is: The Constitution in the
Supreme Court 27, 29-30 (Harv. U. Press 2004); John W. Johnson, Wickard v. Filbum, in The Oxford
Companion to the Supreme Courtof The United States 1088 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d ed., Oxford U. Press 2005)
[hereinafter Oxford Companion]; John W. Johnson, Wickard v. Filburn, in The Oxford Guide to United States
Supreme Court Decisions 332 (Kermit L. Hall ed., Oxford U. Press 1999) [hereinafter Oxford Guide]; John E.
Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, ConstitutionalLaw 181 (6th ed., West 2000) (discussing that with Wickard "the
Court completed the move to recognizing a plenary commerce power based on economic theory"); Tribe, supra
n. 6, at 813-14, 813 n. 22; G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal 198 (Harv. U. Press 2000)
(noting that in Wickard "the Court virtually abandoned the idea of federalism limitations on congressional
legislation based on the commerce power"); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the
Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State
Control Over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 82 (1999) ("Wickard enabled Congress to regulate whatever it
pleased.").
16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see generally Oxford Companion,supra n. 15, at 592; Oxford Guide, supra n.15,
at 164.
17. 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see generally Oxford Companion,supra n. 15, at 653.
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By endorsing Wickard v. Filburn, the Court effectively recognizes a national
police power. Such a broad power to conduct experiments in social engineering 18 is
completely repugnant to the fundamental premise of federalism-the notion that the
federal government has limited, enumerated powers. 19 The stretching of the commerce
power, a limited legislative power, into an unlimited, plenary power is the ultimate
constitutional irony.
II.

GONZALES V. RAICH

The issue in Raich is whether the power granted to Congress by the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause includes the power to prohibit intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation and possession of marijuana for personal-medical 20purposes,
when the marijuana is recommended by a physician pursuant to valid state law.
The marijuana users are two citizens of California, Angel McClary Raich and
Diane Monson. 2 1 Raich and Monson suffer from severe medical conditions. 2 2 Raich
has "an inoperable brain tumor, life-threatening weight loss, a seizure disorder, nausea,
and several chronic pain disorders"; 23 Monson has a degenerative disease of the spine, a
disease that causes her "severe chronic back pain and constant, painful muscle
25
spasms. 24 Though serious, Monson's condition is not life-threatening.
Traditional medicine has "utterly failed ' 26 Raich and Monson. 27 "The only thing
that has provided any relief from symptoms and/or improvement in their condition is
Raich and Monson have used
medication with cannabis [i.e., marijuana]." 28 Both
29
marijuana for medicinal purposes for several years.
Raich and Monson use marijuana, on a doctor's recommendation, on a daily
basis.
They do not purchase or sell marijuana. 3 1 Monson grows the marijuana she
32
Because Raich is unable to grow her own, her two caregivers cultivate several
uses.
varieties of marijuana and provide them to her without charge. 33 Raich's marijuana is
supposedly cultivated using water, nutrients, equipment, supplies, and materials from
34
California.

18. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 827, 837 (1988).
19. See Michael S. Greve, Real Federalism: Why It Matters, How It Could Happen 39 (AEI Press 1999);
The Heritage Guide to the Constitution 103-04 (Edwin Meese III, David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds.,
Regnery Publg. 2005).
20. 125 S. Ct. at 2198-99.
21. Id. at 2195,2199.
22. Id. at2199-200.
23. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2003).
24. Id.
25. See id at 1225.
26. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1225.
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The physicians that treat Raich and Monson prescribe marijuana pursuant to a
California statute, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996.3 5 That statute was enacted after
Proposition 215, a state-wide referendum on the
the voters of California approved
36
marijuana.
medical
of
propriety
On August 15, 2002, sheriffs deputies from Butte County, California and agents
of the federal Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") came to Monson's home. 37 The
deputies concluded that Monson's use of marijuana was permissible under California's
Compassionate Use Act. 38 The DEA disagreed. 39 "[A]fter a three-hour standoff,
including an unsuccessful intervention by the local District Attorney with the United
....the DEA agents seized and destroyed [Monson's] six (6) marijuana
States Attorney
'4°
plants. ,
The DEA acted under the authority of a federal statute, the Controlled Substances
Act ("CSA"). 41' Raich, Monson, and Monson's caregivers sued the Attorney General of
the United States (and other federal officers) for a preliminary injunction preventing the
federal government from enforcing the CSA against them. 42 In particular, Raich,
Monson, and the other plaintiffs wanted the district court to declare that the provisions of
distribution, or possession of marijuana, were
the CSA, prohibiting the manufacture,
43
unconstitutional as applied to them.
The district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction; 44 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 4 5 The Supreme Court granted ' 'the
6
government's petition for certiorari because of "[t]he obvious importance of the case.
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by a vote of six to three.47 Five Justices
48
joined in the majority opinion: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.4 9 Scalia concurred in the judgment. 50 Two
Justices wrote dissenting opinions: O'Connor and Thomas. 5 1 Chief Justice RehnquistLopez and Morrison-and
the architect of the "New Federalism" 52 and the author of
53
II.
Part
except
dissent
O'Connor's
of
Thomas joined in all

35. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199-200, 2199 n. 3 (citing Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5 (West
Supp. 2005)).
36. Id. at 2199.
37. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1225.
38. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200.
39. Id.
40. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
41. Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2200 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-890 (2000)).
42. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
43. ld.at 922.
44. Id.at 931; see Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2200.
45. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235.
46. Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2201.
47. Id. at2198.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198.
52. The "New Federalism" has become a code phrase for federal deference to state and local governments.
See Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 677 ("This 'new federalism' is likely to be the principal legacy of
William Rehnquist as Chief Justice, and as such has been applauded by those who maintain that the
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In essence, the Court held the intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana in Raich
was indistinguishable from the intrastate cultivation and use of wheat in Wickard.54 The
Court held that the medicinal use of marijuana had a substantial effect 55 on interstate
commerce and that, as a consequence, regulation under the Commerce Clause was
appropriate. 56 The actual amount of marijuana used by Raich and Monson, however,
was trivial. 57 As a consequence, all three Commerce Clause paradoxes are involved in
Raich. The relevant conduct is intrastate, not interstate-the Interstate Paradox.

The

conduct was private and personal; it was not commercial-the Commerce Paradox. The
conduct has, at most, a remote and trivial effect on interstate commerce-the Substantial
Paradox.
The Court distinguished Lopez and Morrison; it did not overrule them. 58 Lopez
and Morrison involved discrete, limited purpose statutes-the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 199059 and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994.60 Raich, in contrast,

61
involved a comprehensive statute that regulated several drugs-not just marijuana.

The broad remedial purpose of that comprehensive statute-the CSA-would be
defeated if local cultivation and use of medical marijuana were permitted. 62 The CSA
63
was conceded to be facially valid; it was only alleged to be unconstitutional as applied.

Justice Scalia's concurrence provided an alternative basis for upholding the
CSA. 64 According to Scalia, the regulation of intrastate activities was appropriate by
65
virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Scalia is a textualist. He attempts to base his constitutional interpretations on the
"original understanding" 66 of the Constitution as set forth in the written text. 67 He wrote

Constitution must be read and interpreted in the light of the original intentions and understandings of the
founding generation."); Allison H. Eid, Teaching New Federalism, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 875 (2005); Daniel A.
Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original
Understanding, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 615, pt. 11 (1995); Randy Lee, The New Federalism: Discerning Truth in
American Myths and Legends, 12 Widener L.J. 537 (2003); see also Symposium, The Commerce Clause: Past,
Present,andFuture,55 Ark. L. Rev. 705 (2003) [hereinafter Arkansas Symposium].
53. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198.
54. Id. at 2205-09.
55. Id. at 2205.
56. Id. at 2205-09.
57. Id. at 2207-09 (majority); Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2229 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2209-11; Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 72, 87-88.
59. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; see Barnett, supra n. 9, at 317, 317 nn. 174-175.
60. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; see Barnett, supran. 9, at 317, 317 nn. 174-175.
61. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210-11.
62. Id. The CSA is title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. Id. at 2203. It
is "a comprehensive regime to combat the international and interstate traffic in illicit drugs." Id. The CSA
categorizes all controlled substances into five schedules. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 812(a)). The schedules are
subject to varying levels of control and regulation. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203-04 (citing 21 U.S.C.
§§ 821-830). Marijuana is a Schedule I substance and is subject to strict control and regulation. Id. (citing 21
U.S.C. § 812(c)). See Judge James P. Gray, Why Our Drug Laws Have Failed and What We Can Do About It:
A JudicialIndictment of the War on Drugs 27 (Temple U. Press 2001).
63. Kmiec, supran. 15, at 72.
64. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. ld. at2216.
66. Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 73 (citing Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law (Princeton U. Press 1997)).
67. Id.
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68
a separate concurrence in Raich in order to offer a more "nuanced" analysis.
According to Douglas Kmiec, Scalia 6failed:
"[His concurrence] does not rely on original
9
understanding, and it is not nuanced.
Scalia concedes that intrastate, noncommercial marijuana use is not interstate
commerce. 70 He argues, however, that such an intrastate activity can be regulated under
the Necessary and Proper Clause, because it is necessary in order to make a valid
regulation of interstate commerce (i.e., the CSA) effective. 7 1 According to Scalia, the

intrastate activity need not have a substantial affect on interstate commerce. 72

The

substantial effect test understates Congress's authority. 7 3 "Purely local" activities can be
reached by Congress
75

if necessary

to vindicate

a "comprehensive

scheme" 7 4 of

regulation.
Justice O'Connor's dissent was consistent with

Morrison.

her position in Lopez and

According to O'Connor, Raich is indistinguishable from Lopez and

Morrison.76 The local, intrastate activity--cultivation and use of medicinal marijuanadid not have a substantial affect on interstate commerce. 7 7

As a result, O'Connor

78

concluded that the use of the CSA to prohibit that intrastate activity was inappropriate.
In terms of the three-paradox model, O'Connor rejected the majority's application of the
Substantial Paradox.

79

In response to the Necessary and Proper Clause argument advanced in Scalia's
concurrence, O'Connor observed that
the Necessary and Proper Clause does not change the analysis significantly.

Congress

must exercise its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause in a manner consistent
with basic constitutional principles.... [S]omething more than mere assertion is required
when Congress purports to have power over local activity whose connection to an
int[er]state market is not self-evident. Otherwise, the Necessary and Proper Clause will
80
always be a back door for unconstitutional federal regulation.

68. Id. (referring to Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215).
69. Id. (footnote omitted).
70. Id. (citing Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215-20).
71. Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 73 (citing Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215-20).
72. See id. (citing Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216).
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Id. (citing Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218).
76. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2220-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2224.
78. See id. at 2220-29.
79. See id. at 2221 (noting that the Raich majority opinion is "irreconcilable" with the reasoning of Lopez
and Morrison). O'Connor criticized the majority and Scalia for ignoring the four factors set forth in Lopez and
Morrison:
[i] whether the regulation involves economic activity; [ii] whether the statute has a jurisdictional
element requiring proof of a connection to interstate commerce; [iii] whether Congress made
express legislative findings enabling the Court to understand the substantial effect of the regulated
activity on interstate commerce; and [iv] whether in all events the purported regulatory authority
was based on more than a mere inference that the national economy might be adversely affected.
Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 74, 74 nn. 23-24.
80. Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 74 (quoting Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (citing Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 585 (1985))) (ellipses and brackets in original, footnote omitted).
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Justice Thomas's dissent tracks his concurrence in Lopez. 8 1 Thomas focused on
the text of the commerce clause and the historical definition of "commerce." According
to Thomas, the intrastate activity of growing and using medicinal marijuana did not
involve commerce 82 let alone interstate commerce. 83 For Thomas, commerce must
84
involve trade or exchange-not all forms of economic activity are commerce.
Growing marijuana for personal use was not commerce. 85 As a consequence, the
86
application of the CSA in the Raich case was-in Thomas's view-unconstitutional.
In terms of the three-paradox model, Thomas rejected the majority's use of the Interstate
87
Paradox and the Commerce Paradox.
III.
A.

FEDERALISM

Federalismin Theory

In theory, federalism is "that form of government 'in which a union of states
recognizes the sovereignty of a central authority while retaining certain residual powers
of government."'

88

Professor Edward Corwin has identified six features as intrinsic to

American Constitutional federalism: (1) a union of autonomous states; (2) the division of
powers between the federal government and the states; (3) the direct operation of each
government, within its assigned sphere, on all persons and properly within its territorial
limits; (4) the provision of each government with the complete apparatus of law

enforcement; (5) federal supremacy over any conflicting assertion of state power; and (6)
89

dual citizenship.
Two questions immediately arise: First, how much power should be vested in the
"central authority"-the national or federal government? Second, how much power
should the states retain? The Founders did not answer these questions precisely, but they
did clearly identify the danger zones of extreme centralization/nationalization and
extreme decentralization.
On a spectrum of centralized government, constitutional

81. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
82. Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 74 (citingRaich, 125 S. Ct. at 2230).
83. Id. (citing Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2231).
84. Id (citing Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2230).
85. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2230.
86. See id at 2229-39.
87. According to Thomas, there must be an "obvious, simple, and direct relation between the intrastate ban
and the regulation of interstate commerce." Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 74 (quoting Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2231)
(internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). In the case of the CSA, "Congress presented no evidence in
support of its conclusions, which are not so much findings of fact as assertions of power. Congress cannot
define the scope of its own power merely by declaring the necessity of its enactments." Id. at 74-75 (quoting
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2233) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
88. William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the
Cellophane Sea, 1987 Duke L.J. 769, 770 (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary 494 (2d College ed.,
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1982)) (footnote omitted).
89. Norman Redlich, John Attanasio & Joel K. Goldstein, ConstitutionalLaw 238 (4th ed., LexisNexis
2002) [hereinafter Redlich, Attanasio & Goldstein, Constitutional Law] (quoting Edward S. Corwin, The
Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis And Interpretation xi-xii (U.S. Govt. Printing Off.
1953)); Norman Redlich, John Attanasio & Joel K. Goldstein, UnderstandingConstitutionalLaw 151 (3d ed.,
Matthew Bender & Co. 2005).
90. Van Alstyne, supra n. 88, at 770.
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federalism stands approximately midway between the extremes of (1)a dangerously
strong regime-the "national state" 9 1 in which the paramount principle is democratic
centralism, and (2) a dangerously weak regime-a "mere
confederacy," 92 like the United
93
States government under the Articles of Confederation.
The Founders' best and most definitive thoughts about federalism-the balance of
power between the federal governments and the states-are contained in the text of the
Constitution. Great insight can be gathered, however, from The Federalist Papers, a
series of op-ed pieces published by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay
during the debate over the ratification of the Constitution. 94 In FederalistNo. 45, James
Madison wrote:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most
part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the
95
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
Two principles of federalism are announced in the quoted language. The first
principle is that the states retain a general "police power"-the power to engage in what
Blackstone called the
'due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals of the state,
like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to
the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good
manners: and to be decent,
96
industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.'
97
Most assertions of governmental authority involve the police power.

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.at 770 n. 2; see Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution:A Biography 106 (Random House 2005).
At the "nation state" extreme, the states are administrative units--or agents---of the national government; at the
"mere confederacy" extreme, the national government is the agent of the sovereign states; in the "constitutional
federalism" model, both the states and the national government are sovereign, they are largely independent of
each other and they compete. See Fried, supra n. 15, at 13-19; Greve, supra n. 19, at 2. The federal system
has been characterized as a dynamic system possessing physical properties-inertia, centrifugal (pro-state)
force, centripetal (pro-central government) force. See Duckworth v. Ark., 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson,
J.,
concurring); Tribe, supran. 6, at 1027, 1027 n. 26.
94. See Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism. "Neither a National Nor a Federal Constitution,
But a Composition of Both," 86 Yale L.J. 1273, 1285 (1977) ("Publius (the pen name Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay used in writing [The FederalistPapers]) remains our most instructive political thinker.").
95. James Madison, FederalistNo. 45, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, The Federalist
Papers 277, 289 (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic 1961) (quoted in part in Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2229
(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552). All citations hereinafter to The FederalistPapers are to
this edition.
96. Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 741 (quoting Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
vol. 4, 127-28 (Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publg. Ltd. 2001)). One classic definition of "police power"
is "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property."
Epstein, supra n. 9, at 44 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
97. See Madison, FederalistNo. 45, in Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The FederalistPapers, supra n. 95,
at 289.
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The second principle of federalism is that the powers of the federal government are
limited and enumerated. In Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "[e]very law
enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the
Constitution. '' 98 In making that statement, Rehnquist relied on Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison: "The powers of the legislature are defined and limited;
and that
99
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the [C]onstitution is written."
The powers of Congress are set forth in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
Those powers include the Commerce Clause, a provision that Professor Bernard
Schwartz called "the most important substantive power vested in the Federal
Government in time of peace." 10 0 The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
10 1
Tribes."
Indian
the
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was called in large part because of the need
to assert national controls over interstate commerce. ° 2 Under the Articles of
Confederation, many states had erected barriers to interstate trade (e.g., protective
tariffs). 103

Those state measures stifled trade and discouraged the development of a

national economy.

10 4

"The Commerce Clause emerged as the Framers' response to the

central problem giving rise to the Constitution itself:

the absence of any federal

commerce power under the Articles of Confederation., 10 5 In theory, the Commerce
Clause granted Congress a limited power-the power to regulate interstate commerce.

98. 529 U.S. at 607. "Federalism's core is the notion of enumerated powers granted to Congress under
Article I of the Constitution." Greve, supra n. 19, at 25.
99. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (quoting 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The quotation from Marbury continues:
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between
a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the
persons on whom they are imposed.
Barnett, supran. 9, at I (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
100. Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 47 (Oxford U. Press 1993); see William H.
Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 36 (new ed., Alfred A. Knopf 2001) (suggesting the same).
101. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8(3); see Schwartz, supra n. 100, at 47.
102. Schwartz, supra n. 100, at 47 ("The need to federalize regulation of commerce was one of the principal
needs that motivated the Constitutional Convention of 1787.").
103. See Bickel, supra n. 2, at 229.
104. See id.
105. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205 (footnote omitted); see Bickel, supra n. 2, at 229 ("The Court early
formulated, and justly attributed to the Framers of the Constitution, the principled goal of an open national
economy-a common market, to use the term now current in Europe. This is an extremely broad principle,
excruciatingly difficult to apply."); Schwartz, supra n. 100, at 47; Tribe, supra n. 6 at 1044 (discussing "the
widely-held belief that the Articles of Confederation had failed in large part because the states had waged
destructive trade wars against one another."). In FederalistNo. 42, Madison wrote:
The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several
members is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by
experience.... [Wlithout this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating
foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this
power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States from the improper
contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State
and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and
export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of
the latter and the consumers of the former.
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In practice, the Commerce Clause came to allow Congress to do much more than
regulate interstate commerce. According to Felix Frankfurter, the Commerce Clause
"has throughout the Court's history been the chief source of its adjudications regarding
federalism."106
Eventually-after decades of common law evolution and the Constitutional
Revolution of 1937-the commerce power grew to be a "plenary national police power."
That power provided the foundation for the current national government-an institution
that has been called the "Bureaucratic State," the "Administrative State," and the
10 7
"Welfare State."
The process of evolution was not smooth or continuous. The Court's Commerce
Clause decisions cannot be harmonized and synthesized into a grand unified theory; they
conflict.' 0 8 The three Commerce Clause paradoxes emerged gradually.
1.

Gibbons v. Ogden

The Commerce Clause was construed and applied by the Court in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 109 the steamboat monopoly case.
Prior to Gibbons, "[t]he Commerce
Clause ... had received practically no judicial explication, and no one knew how far it
reached."'110 In Gibbons, the State of New York granted the exclusive right to engage in
steamboat navigation in the waters of New York to Robert Fulton and his partner, Robert
Livingston. I l ' Aaron Ogden held a license from Fulton and Livingston, and held a
1 12
submonopoly on the route from Elizabeth Point, New Jersey to New York City.
Thomas Gibbons had a federal coasting license and also ran boats between New Jersey

James Madison, FederalistNo. 42, in Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The FederalistPapers, supra n. 95, at 260,
263-64 (emphasis added); see also Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of
the States, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 483, 513-15 (1997) (defining "free trade areas," "customs unions," and
"common markets" and suggesting that the Constitution may have created a "customs union" but not a
"common market").
106. Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause: Under Marshall, Taney and Waite 66-67 (UNC Press 1937)
(quoted in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 579) (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring). Interestingly, Frankfurter observed
that "no other body of opinions affords a fairer or more revealing test of judicial qualities" than the Court's
Commerce Clause opinions. Id. at 67; see The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, supra n. 19, at 101 ("No
clause in the 1787 Constitution has been more disputed, and it has generated more cases than any other.").
107. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 253-66 (U. Chi. Press 1960); Oxford Companion,
supra n. 15, at 12-18, 678; Gene Smiley, Rethinking the Great Depression 151-54 (Ivan R. Dee 2002)
(discussing the regulatory state; social welfare programs); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1231, 1231 nn. 1-2 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism
After The New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 430, 447-48 (1987).
108. See Epstein, supra n. 9, at 1-3, 45; Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 32-104
(U. Chi. Press 1948); Arkansas Symposium, supra n. 52; see also The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, supra
n. 19, at 102; Scalia, supra n. 66, at 37-47 (criticizing the use of the common law methodology for
constitutional adjudication).
109. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
110. Melvin I. Urofsky & Paul Finkelman, A March of Liberty: A ConstitutionalHistory of the United States
vol. 1, 224 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 2002); see Epstein, supra n. 9, at 25.
111. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1; Redlich, Attanasio & Goldstein, ConstitutionalLaw, supra n. 89, at 90;
Urofsky & Finkelman, supra n. 110, at 223.
112. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1-2; Redlich, Attanasio & Goldstein, ConstitutionalLaw, supra n. 89, at 90;
Urofsky & Finkelman, supra n. 110, at 223-24.
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and Manhattan. 11 3 As a consequence, Gibbons was a competitor of Ogden. Ogden sued
114
Gibbons for encroachment of the monopoly granted by the State of New York.
Gibbons defended by saying the state-granted monopoly violated the Commerce
Clause. 115
The Court ruled for Gibbons. 116 In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the
Court found that the federal statute governing the coasting trade, and Gibbons's license,
was a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 117 As a
consequence, the federal statute was the supreme law of the land under the Supremacy
Clause. 118
In the course of the opinion, Marshall was required to construe the Commerce

Clause.
Marshall defined "commerce" as "intercourse," 19 and recognized that
commerce extended into each state. 12
Congress had the power to regulate "that
commerce which concerns more States than one."' 12 1 That power extended to commerce
12 2
that occurred within a state.
Marshall stated that the judiciary should not interfere with Congress's exercise of
its commerce power:
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified
objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single
government, having in its constitution the same restrictions
on the exercise of the power as
12 3
are found in the constitution of the United States.

The quoted passage has great significance for federalism. In the sphere of interstate
commerce, the federal government has almost exclusive power. "The subject [of
interstate commerce] is as completely taken from the state legislatures as if they had
been expressly forbidden to act on it."

12 4

113. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 2; Redlich, Attanasio & Goldstein, Constitutional Law, supra n. 89, at 90;
Urofsky & Finkelman, supra n. 110, at 223.
114. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1-2; Redlich, Attanasio & Goldstein, Constitutional Law, supra n. 89, at 90;
Urofsky & Finkelman, supra n. 110, at 222-24.
115. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 186. Gibbons was represented by Daniel Webster. Webster argued for two and a
half days. See Rehnquist, supra n. 100, at 242.
116. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 239-40.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 210-11. The Supremacy Clause is set forth in the U.S. Constitution, art. VI, and states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
119. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193.
120. Id.; see Barnett,supra n. 9, at 291-94 ("Commerce" includes "navigation.").
121. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194.
122. Id. Marshall stated "Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each
State, but may be introduced into the interior." Id. Barnett is critical of Marshall's interpretation of the
Commerce Clause language "among the states." Barnett, supra n. 9, at 301-02. Barnett believes that
Marshall's formulation is too expansive: "Marshall's formulation has improperly permitted the expansion of
the power to regulate commerce beyond that which actually crosses state lines." Id.
at 302.
123. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197.
124. Paul Johnson, A History of the American People 238 (HarperPerennial 1997) (quoting Justice Marshall
in Gibbons) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
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Significantly, Marshall acknowledged a limit to the commerce power. He said that
Congress lacked authority to regulate the "internal" 125 commerce of a state.126 Marshall
said regulation of intrastate commerce would be repugnant to the "genius and
character,, 127 of the federal government:
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be
applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which
affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State,
which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the
purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely
12 8
internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself.

Professor David Currie thinks the "genius and character" passage of Gibbons is
significant: "It bears emphasizing that in Gibbons ... the great exponent of national
power [i.e., Chief Justice Marshall] expressly acknowledged significant limitations on
the reach of federal legislation."' 129 According to Currie, "it was Marshall's
successors
' 130
who were to expand the commerce power to cover virtually everything."
As interpreted by Marshall in Gibbons, the Commerce Clause fulfilled and realized
its vital but limited purpose-the creation of a free trade zone, a "common market"

125. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 1789-1888, at 170,
170 n. 88 (U. Chi. Press 1985) (footnote omitted).
130. 1d. at 170, 170 n. 89 (citing Wickard as an example) (footnote omitted). Charles F. Hobson, editor of
The Papersof John Marshall,has observed:
Marshall surely recognized the opportunity to give a broad scope to the positive powers of
Congress. Yet this objective was subordinate to his judicial task of reaching a satisfactory
resolution of the particular case. As a legal controversy Gibbons was less about defining the extent
of federal power than about setting limits on state sovereignty. More precisely, it was an inquiry
into how far an affirmative federal power operated as a negative upon state legislation. The case
compelled the Court to confront the perplexing problem of American federalism: where to draw the
line of demarcation between federal and state sovereignty. In this respect Gibbons has a studied
ambiguity that made it an uncertain guide for subsequent cases arising under the commerce clause.
The opinion reflects a determined effort to avoid drawing a precise boundary between the federal
commerce power and the permissible field of state legislation. Marshall implicitly acknowledged
that this question must perpetually arise and could only be settled, more or less, over the course of
many adjudications. In a single case there was no need to pursue this "delicate inquiry" any further
than was necessary to decide the particular question before the Court. Whether intentionally or not,
Gibbons opened the door to greater exercise of federal judicial power and enhanced the Supreme
Court's role as "final arbiter in federal-state relations." The chief justice, of course, never doubted
that the Constitution had "devolved this important duty" on the Supreme Court.
As an attempt to arbitrate between the competing claims of federal and state sovereignty, Gibbons
by no means reflects an uncompromising nationalism. The opinion permitted an ample field for
state legislative activity in the area of commerce and the economy. The scope given to Congress's
authority to regulate commerce, broad as it was, did not encompass intrastate commerce. Nor did it
touch the mass of state powers grouped under the rubric of the "police power." Moreover, the
decision did not endorse the exclusive power theory, the notion that the commerce clause by itself
operated as a general prohibition on the states.
Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law 145 (U. Press Kan. 1996)
(footnotes omitted).
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among the states. "The freedom of interstate commerce, guaranteed by the' 13US
1
Constitution, made America by the 1860s the largest free-trading area in the world."
2.

1829 to 1895

After Gibbons, the Commerce Clause was not read consistently. From 1829 until
1895, the Court read the Commerce Clause somewhat narrowly. Four early cases
involved state statutes. In Brown v. Maryland (1827), 132 the Court (per Chief Justice
Marshall) struck down a Maryland statute that imposed a tax on importers of out-of-state
goods. 13 3

In Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Company (1829), 134 the Court (per

Chief Justice Marshall) upheld the constitutionality of a Delaware statute that permitted a
company to build a dam across a minor navigable river. 135 In Cooley v. Board of
Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia(1851), 136 the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute

that regulated pilotage into the port of Philadelphia on public safety grounds, using a
doctrine called "selective exclusiveness."

13 7

In Veazie v. Moor (1852),138 the Court

upheld a state-created monopoly because it involved regulation of wholly internal
commerce-that is, intrastate commerce.

139

131. Johnson, supra n. 124, at 532; see Bickel, supra n. 2, at 229 (discussing the common market); Paul
Kens, Lochner v. New York: Economic Regulation on Trial 96 (U. Press Kan. 1998) ("The goal of the
commerce clause was the creation of a 'common market' under the protection of the national government.").
Gibbons has been described as "the emancipation proclamation of American commerce." Jean Edward Smith,
John Marshall: Definer of a Nation 473 (Henry Holt & Co. 1996) (citing Charles Warren, A History of the
American Bar 396 (Little, Brown & Co. 1911)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gardbaum, supra
n. 105, at 513-15.
132. 25 U.S. 419 (1827).
133. Id. at 449; Urofsky & Finkelman, supra n. 110, at 225. The Brown Court announced the "original
package" doctrine-"a doctrine that remained in effect for over a century." Urofsky & Finkelman, supra
n. 110, at 225; see Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 113-14. Under the original package doctrine, states
could not tax or otherwise regulate goods that crossed state lines if they remained in their original packages.
Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 113; Tribe, supra n. 6, at 1046, 1046 n. 2; Urofsky & Finkelman, supra
n. 110, at 225; see Epstein, supra n. 9, at 26-27.
134. 27 U.S. 245 (1829).
135. Id. at 249-50; Epstein, supra n. 9, at 30; Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 1091; Schwartz, supra
n. 100, at 81-82; Urofsky & Finkelman, supra n. 110, at 226.
136. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
137. Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 899. The doctrine of "selective exclusiveness" held that the power
to regulate interstate commerce was not vested exclusively in the federal/national government. Id. As a
general rule, matters requiring uniform rules were to be regulated by the federal government, while matters in
which diversity was desirable were regulated by the states. Id. In the latter case, a case-by-case assessment
was required. Id. Cooley is an early example of the "balancing approach to law"; it "foreshadowed modem
constitutional jurisprudence." Schwartz, supran. 100, at 88; see also Tribe, supra n. 6, at 1046-49.
[T]he enduring legacy of Cooley has been this basic theme: The validity of state action affecting
interstate commerce must be judged in light of the desirability, in terms of the Constitution's
structure and goals, of permitting diverse responses to local needs and the undesirability, again
evaluated by a constitutional metric, of permitting local interference with such uniformity as the
unimpeded flow of interstate commerce may require.
Tribe, supra n. 6, at 1048; see Epstein, supra n. 9, at 31 ("[The] ostensible safety argument [for regulating
pilotage] was just pretext for the usual local anticompetitive preferences.").
138. 55 U.S. 568 (1852).
139. Id. at 573-75. Veazie is discussed in Lopez. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553-54.
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After the Civil War, 14 0 Congress exercised its power under the Commerce Clause
in new and more expansive ways. Among other things, Congress enacted the Interstate
Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.141 In time, the new
federal statutes were challenged.
In United States v. E.C. Knight Company (1895), 14 2-the "Sugar Trust Case"-the
Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to a manufacturing trust, because
the commerce power did not extend to manufacturing-an activity that fell within the
states' police power. 143 E.C. Knight posited a manufacturing/commerce dichotomy and
made a distinction between direct effects on commerce (proper subjects of the commerce
power) and indirect effects on commerce (matters outside the scope of the commerce
model, the E.C. Knight Court rejected (or
power). 144 In terms of the three-paradox
145
Paradox.
Commerce
avoided) the

140. The Civil War was, in many ways, a dispute over federalism. The Taney Court had rendered several
decisions that were grounded in notions of decentralization and states' rights. E.g. Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1856). That approach to constitutional interpretation was discredited by, and as a result of, the Civil
War. See Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 177-79; Urofsky & Finkelman, supra n. 110, at 320-450.
To this day, some people equate federalism with slavery, nullification, and secession.
141. Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 75; Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 193. In 1886, the Court invalidated an
Illinois statute that regulated long and short railway hauls that crossed state lines. Wabash, St. Louis & P. Ry.
Co. v. Ill., 118 U.S. 557, 565 (1886); Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 75. The Court observed that rates for hauls that
were wholly within Illinois would be subject to state regulation. Wabash, 118 U.S. at 577; see Kmiec, supra
n. 15, at 76-78; The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, supra n. 19, at 102.
142. 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see generally The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, supra n. 19, at 102-03.
143. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 15-16.
144. Id. at 16; see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 570 (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring); Barnett, supra n. 9,
at 294-95. Chief Justice Fuller observed in E.C. Knight: "'Slight reflection will show that if the national power
extends to all contracts and combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and other productive industries,
whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, comparatively little of business operations and affairs
would be left for state control."' Schwartz, supra n. 100, at 183 (quoting E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16).
Professor Schwartz protests that "[i]f the commerce power did not extend to manufacture, agriculture, mining,
and other productive industries, comparatively little of business operations and affairs in this country would
really be subject to federal control." Id. It is unclear why additional federal control of commerce is
(1) constitutional or (2) desirable. As previously indicated, the Commerce Clause had already achieved its
purpose. It had created the largest free-trading area in the world. Bickel, supra n. 2, at 229; Johnson, supra
n. 124, at 532. Schwartz appears to be advocating a version of the Commerce Paradox-that the Commerce
Clause is about expanding and extending federal power, as opposed to interstate commerce.
Many commentators read E.C. Knight together with Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888), a case
upholding a state manufacture of intoxicating liquor. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 25-26; see e.g. Schwartz, supra n. 100,
at 183 (criticizing Kidd and E.C. Knight as an "artificial and mechanical separation of 'manufacturing' from
'commerce,"' and comparing that approach unfavorably to Marshall's conception of commerce "as an organic
whole"). Kidd followed Marshall's opinion in Gibbons and held that the commerce power "does not
comprehend the purely internal domestic commerce of a State which is carried on between man and man within
a State or between different parts of the same State." Kidd, 128 U.S. at 17, 20-22.
145. According to Kmiec, "Knight is often understood to have drawn a distinction between manufacturing
and commerce, with the former outside federal power and the latter within it." Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 78
(footnote omitted). "This is a misreading of Knight." Id. Kmiec is impressed by Justice Harlan's dissent.
Harlan would have upheld the Sherman Act's application under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 78-79;
see E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 35-37 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan's Necessary and Proper Clause
argument is much more limited than Scalia's Necessary and Proper Clause argument in Raich. Kmiec, supra
n. 15, at 80-81. According to Kmiec, Knight created confusion by not taking Harlan's Necessary and Proper
Clause argument into account, and by placing disproportionate emphasis on the manufacturing/commerce
distinction. Id. at 78-81; see also Epstein, supra n. 9, at 34 (noting that in E.C. Knight, the Court "rightly
stated that manufacturing fell outside the scope of the commerce power but wrongly concluded that a merger of
corporations that did business in New Jersey and Pennsylvania should be treated as manufacturing").
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1902 to 1937

Between 1902 and 1937, the Court's reading of the Commerce Clause was subtle
and varied. 14 6 In some cases the Court read the Commerce Clause expansively and
creatively. For example, in Swift and Company v. United States (1905), 147 the Court
(per Justice Holmes) found that a price-fixing arrangement among Chicago meat-packers
was a restraint on trade even though it was done locally. 148 The distribution of meat
involved the "stream of commerce," a metaphor that came, in many cases, to replace and

49
supplant the more formalistic "commerce/manufacturing" distinction of E. C. Knight.1
15 1
Champion v. Ames (1903),150 "took the commerce power beyond commerce.'

In Champion, the Court held the power to regulate interstate commerce included the
power to prohibit certain forms of commerce. 15 2 By a vote of five to four, the Court
upheld a federal statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of lottery tickets. 15 3 The
Court held that the power to regulate commerce included the power to prohibit
commerce.

154

Champion-the "Lottery Case"-is significant because it recognized a

national "police power" that was analogous to the state "police power." Accordingly, the
commerce power was not limited to statutes that advanced or protected interstate
commerce; Congress could regulate and protect the public morality. 155 In terms of the

146. See Tribe,supran.6,at810,8t0n.8.
147. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
148. Id. at 390-402.
149. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 168 ("Although the stockyard activity took place within a single
state, it was but a temporary stop in the interstate sale of cattle."); Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 157;
Oxford Guide, supra n. 15, at 49-50; Tribe, supra n. 6, at 810, 810 n. 9. According to Kmiec, Swift resolves
problems created by Knight:
Looked at formally, the slaughterhouse business in Chicago was completely intrastate and, under
the Knight majority, might have been thought to be beyond the reach of Congress. But the Court
took note of the fact that the slaughterhouse business was just one way station in an interstate
industry that encompassed everything from ranching to the retailing of beef
Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 82 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v.
United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353-54 (1914), is the Court's ruling on what is known as the "Shreveport Rate
Cases." The Shreveport Rate Cases involved an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation of rates for an
intrastate haul. Id. at 345-46. The regulation was upheld because it had a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce and it vindicated the text of the Commerce Clause: The regulation prevented the
balkanization of the national market. Id.at 359. Epstein is very critical of the Shreveport Rate Cases:
The key move in Shreveport was to commandeer the very broad definition of "injury" and
"harm"-which now covered competitive losses-to expand the scope of the Commerce Clause so
that the purely interior traffic of any state was no longer beyond the reach of federal power. The
upshot was that the federal power now gobbled up huge portions of the transportation grid that once
lay beyond it.
Epstein, supra n. 9, at 57-58.
150. 188 U.S. 321 (1903); see generally Barnett, supra n. 9, at 310-12, 324; The Heritage Guide to the
Constitution, supra n. 19, at 103.
151. See Kmiec, supra n.15, at 83.
152. Champion, 188 U.S. at 363-64.
153. Id.
154. Id.at 355. The four Champion dissenters objected that the power to regulate commerce did not include
the power to absolutely prohibit commerce. Id at 364-75 (Fuller, C.J. & Brewer, Shiras & Peckham, JJ.
dissenting). The states did not cede that power to the federal government in the Constitution. Id. at 371; see
Barnett, supra n. 9, at 311.
155. Champion, 188 U.S. at 356-65. Following the Court's decision in Champion, Congress exercised its
"police power" and enacted several statutes intended to protect the public morality. Oxford Guide, supra n. 15,
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three-paradox model, Champion relied on the Commerce Paradox: The Commerce
156
Clause is not about interstate commerce; it is about expanding Congressional power.
According to Professors Nowak and Rotunda, "[t]he year 1905 marks the point at
which a majority of the Justices had enough of what they considered to be unjustified
tampering with the economic and social order." 157 The Court decided Lochner v. New
159
York, 158 holding a state law setting maximum hours for bakers to be unconstitutional.
Other cases relied on the Commerce
Lochner relied on the due process clause. 16
Justices
invalidated statutes regulating the sale
Clause. In the next six years the Lochner
16 1
the quarantine of diseased animals, 162 the
of intoxicating beverages to Indians,
163
and the prohibition of
imposition of liability on employers for employee injuries,

harboring alien women. 164
In Hammer v. Dagenhart(1918), 165 -the "Child Labor Case"--the Court read the
Commerce Clause narrowly. 166 The Court held, five-to-four, that a federal statute-the
Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916-was unconstitutional. 167 The Act prohibited
certain
the interstate transportation of goods made in factories or mines by children under
169
ages. 168 Its passage has been called "the climax of the Progressive movement."'

at 49-50. "[Tlhe Mann Act of 1910... made it a crime to transport women across state lines for immoral
purposes." Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 194. The Mann Act was upheld in Hoke v. United States, 227
U.S. 308 (1913). See Levi, supra n. 108, at 33-57; Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 194. The Automobile
Theft Act of 1915 made it a federal offense to knowingly drive a stolen car across a state line. Oxford
Companion, supra n. 15, at 194. It was upheld in Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925). See Oxford
Companion, supra n. 15, at 194.
Upon
156. Champion may use a fourth Commerce Clause paradox: "Regulate means prohibit."
consideration, however, the equation of regulation and prohibition appears to be an aspect of the Commerce
Paradox. Prohibition is a form of power; the "commerce power" is about power. See Barnett, supra n. 9,
at 310-12.
According to Kmiec:
[T]he real significance of Champion was not its distinction between regulatory promotion or
restriction but an unfortunate acceptance of judicial abdication-the notion that the Court had no
duty to inquire whether either means, promotion, or restriction, was legitimately aimed at the
subject matter of interstate commerce.
By this judicial complacency, the commerce power was extended to non-commerce purposes in
the early twentieth century. Mistakenly, the constitutionality of the question became popularly
inseparable from the underlying policy issues.
Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 83; see Epstein, supra n. 9, at 71 ("[N]o one at the time supposed that this decision [i.e.,
Champion] allowed Congress to regulate the manufacture of those [lottery] tickets or even their local use.").
157. Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 168-69 (footnote omitted); compare Tribe, supra n. 6, at 810, 810
n. 8.
158. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
159. Id. at 46, 64-65; Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 169.
160. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53; Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 169.
161. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905), overruled, U.S. v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); Nowak & Rotunda,
supra n. 15, at 169-70.
162. Ill. C. R.R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514 (1906); Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 169.
163. Howard v. Ill. C. R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 463 (1908); Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 169.
164. Keller v. U.S., 213 U.S. 138 (1909); Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 169.
165. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
166. See Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 417-18; Oxford Guide, supra n. 15, at 122-23.
167. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268, 281; Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 417-18.
168. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 269; Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 417-18.
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The Court found the Act was not a valid exercise of the commerce power. 170 The
Act violated the Commerce Clause because it regulated the conditions of production (i.e.,
the use of child labor). 17 1 There was nothing objectionable about the goods produced by
child labor, or about the introduction of those goods into interstate commerce. The harm
addressed by the Act was a local activity-an activity that could be addressed by state
police power. 172 "The act in its effect does not regulate transportation among the states,
but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and
manufacturing within the states."' 173 In terms of the three-paradox model, Hammer
rejected the Commerce Paradox-it read "commerce" to read "commerce."
According to the government, the Act was necessary to eliminate unfair
competition against states that prohibited child welfare. 174 Justice William Day and the
majority found that "Congress had no power to equalize market conditions that were not
' 175
a part of interstate commerce."
In an obscure passage in the Hammer opinion, Justice Day suggested that the
state's right to exercise its police power was protected by the Tenth Amendment. 176 The
Tenth Amendment provides that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."' 177 According to Day, the Tenth Amendment reserved the regulation of
some activities for the states and the regulation of other activities for federal
government. 178 Day suggested in Hammer that there are some significant powers that
Congress cannot exercise. 179 ..[I]f Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to local
authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in interstate commerce,.., the
power of the States over local matters may be eliminated, and thus our system of
180
government be practically destroyed.'

169. Oxford Guide, supra n. 15, at 122 (citing Stephen B. Wood, ConstitutionalPolitics in the Progressive
Era: Child Labor and the Law (U. Chi. Press 1968)); see Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 83-84; Oxford Companion,
supra n. 15, at 194.
170. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 277.
171. Id. at 272; Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 170.
172. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273-74; Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 170.
173. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271-72.
174. Id. at 273; Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 170.
175. Nowak & Rotunda, supran. 15, at 170; see Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273-74.
176. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 274; Currie, supra n. 15, at 97; see Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 84; Nowak & Rotunda,
supran. 15, at 170.
177. U.S. Const. amend. X.
178. Currie, supra n. 15, at 97.
179. Id. (discussing Hammer, 247 U.S. at 274-76).
180. Id. at 97 n. 43 (quoting Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276) (bracket in original, ellipses in original). Liberal
commentators have condemned Hammer. See Schwartz, supra n. 100, at 212 ("Most commentators today
place [Hammer] with Lochner on the list of discredited Supreme Court decisions."). Some libertarian
commentators believe that Hammer was correctly decided. See e.g. Richard A. Epstein, Skepticism and
Freedom: A Modern Case for ClassicalLiberalism 126-27, 278 n. 42 (U. Chi. Press 2003). Epstein observes
that there is no reason to believe that state child labor statutes were inadequate-that they did not protect
children. See Epstein, supra n. 9, at 61. Progressives-the advocates of a federal statute-assumed that the
states were engaged in a "race to the bottom." Id. According to Epstein, "the percentage of children in the
workforce declined consistently throughout the period before federal regulation of child labor." Id. at 62.
Epstein presents data showing that the percentage of the workforce between the ages of ten and fifteen
decreased from 6.02% in 1900 to 3.34% in 1920. Id. at 5-6.
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4.

The Constitutional Crisis of 1937

Hammer was the law when Franklin D. Roosevelt became President of the United
States in 1933. Elected on the promise of a "New Deal"-immediate action to end the
Great Depression-Roosevelt proposed a number of new federal statutes, and Congress
passed many of them. 18 1 "New Deal" measures included the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the Railroad Retirement
Act of 1934, and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.182 In 1935 and 1936,
the Court found all of these New Deal statutes to be unconstitutional. In so ruling, the
the restrictive view of the Commerce Clause
Court commonly and frequently relied on
83
announced in Hammer and E.C. Knight. 1
Roosevelt responded to the Court's attack on the New Deal by denouncing its
"horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce."' 184 In 1937, one year after his
landslide re-election, Roosevelt proposed what has become known as the "court-packing
plan." 185 Under that plan, Roosevelt would have been able to name one additional
Justice to the Court for each Justice over the age of seventy. 186 At that time, there were
six Justices over seventy and the Court was known as the "Nine Old Men."

18 7

The idea

was to obtain a majority that could be relied upon to uphold New Deal legislation.

1 88

The stalemate between Roosevelt and the Court has been called the "Constitutional

Revolution of 1937."189
Before the plan was voted upon by Congress, Justice Owen Roberts-the first
Justice Roberts-broke the stalemate and ended the constitutional crisis. Roberts shifted

181. See Barnett, supra n. 9, at 219; Hayek, supra n. 107, at 190; Johnson, supra n. 124, at 747-68;
Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 172; Rehnquist, supra n. 100, at 116-17.
182. Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 172-75; see generally Jim Powell, FDR's Folly: How Roosevelt and
His New Deal ProlongedThe GreatDepression (Crown Forum 2003); White, supra n. 15, at 13-14.
183. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (overruling the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
of 1935); U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (overruling the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (overruling the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933);
R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)
(overruling the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1993) (overruling the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934);
see Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 172-75; Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 453-54, 678; Schwartz,
supra n. 100, at 231-33. The New Deal cases made a number of interesting points. Barnett states that the U.S.
Supreme Court, in A.L.A. Schechter, found the National Recovery Act to be unconstitutional because it
"permitted the regulation of commerce wholly within a state." Barnett, supra n. 9, at 221; Epstein, supra n. 9,
at 64-66. Carter defined "commerce" as "the equivalent of the phrase 'intercourse for the purpose of
trade."' 298 U.S. at 298; see Barnett, supra n. 9, at 295.
184. Oxford Companion,supra n. 15, at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 175; Oxford Companion, supran. 15, at 233
188. Oxford Companion, supran. 15, at 233.
189. See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a ConstitutionalRevolution 4
(Oxford U. Press 1998); Hayek, supra n. 107, at 190-92; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan
to F.D.R. 311 (Alfred A. Knopf 1955); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The
ConstitutionalRevolution in the Age of Roosevelt 213 (Oxford U. Press 1995); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial
Constitution41, 51 (Harv. U. Press 1993) ("We should understand the revolution of 1937 as the vindication of
the New Deal in the Supreme Court."); White, supra n. 15, at 13-14, 198-236.
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Roberts's shift-called the "switch in time that saved

192
nine"191-and the retirement of Justice Van Devanter, gave Roosevelt a majority.
Over the next four years, Roosevelt was able to appoint seven new Justices-Hugo
Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter,
William 0. Douglas, Frank Murphy, Robert H.
193
Jackson, and Wiley Rutledge.
The Roosevelt Justices adopted an expansive view of the Commerce Clause. In

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), 194 the Court

upheld the National Labor Relations Act of 1935-a statute that guaranteed collective
bargaining to all employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate
commerce. 19 5 In United States v. Darby (1941), 196 the Court upheld the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938-a statute that imposed wage and hour regulations on goods sold
in interstate commerce. 197 Darby expressly overruled Hammer.198 The Court held that
the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered." '1 99 After Darby, the Tenth Amendment was not seen as a basis for
invalidating federal laws. 20 That view of the Tenth Amendment survived for many
years.

190. Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 234. Justice Roberts had been a successful practitioner in
Philadelphia prior to his appointment to the Court by President Herbert Hoover. He attached national attention
as a special prosecutor in the Teapot Dome Scandals. Id.
at 860; Schwartz, supra n. 100, at 228.
191. Epstein, supra n. 9, at 1 (footnote omitted); Oxford Companion, supran. 15, at 234.
192. Oxford Companion,supra n. 15, at 233; see Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 175-76.
193. Oxford Companion,supra n. 15, at 454.
194. 301 U.S. 1(1937).
195. Id. at 36-38, 49. In a later decision, the Court noted the decision in Jones & Laughlin "departed from
the [old] distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' effects on interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555;
Fried, supra n. 15, at 26.
196. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
197. Id.at 125-26; Oxford Companion,supra n. 15, at 249.
198. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116-17. Justice Stone justified the regulation of intrastate commerce by referring to
the Necessary and Proper Clause:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce
among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce ... as
to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of
the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Id.at 118; Barnett, supra n. 9, at 227; see Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74
Tex. L. Rev. 795, 807, 810-14 (1996). In Darby, "the Court ceased holding Congress to its enumerated
Commerce Power." Barnett, supra n. 9, at 229.
199. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
200. Chemerinsky, supra n. 15, at 254; Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 85. For many years, the Tenth Amendment
was regarded as a truism. In the mid-1970s, the Tenth Amendment became an important limitation on federal
power. See Natl. League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Fry v. U.S., 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Currie, supra n. 15, at 564-67; Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 1008.
Two observations must be made about the Constitutional Revolution of 1937. First, it is not clear
whether the Roosevelt "court-packing plan" was a symptom or a cause of the constitutional crisis. See White,
supra n. 15, at 234, 305. Second, Roberts and others occasionally expressed doubts about the new
orthodoxy-the post-Darbyview of the Commerce Clause. See Cushman, supra n. 189, at 222-23.
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5.

Wickard v. Filburn

The decision[,Wickard v. Filburn,] cannotpass the "giggle test."
Richard A. Epstein

20 1

20 3
2°2
Wickard v. Filburn was acknowledged as the "epitaph for federalism."
According to the Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, Wickard
is "[p]erhaps the decision that best indicated how completely the Supreme Court had
come in acquiescing to the nationalist economic philosophy of President Franklin
Roosevelt and the Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress." 20 4 After
Wickard, Congress had carte blanche to regulate intrastate conduct (even neighborhood
2° 5
Wickard was "a judicial endorsement of congressional
lemonade stands).
20 6
omnipotence."
The Agricultural Adjustment Act ("AAA") authorized the Secretary of Agriculture
to set a quota for wheat production. 2° 7 Each farmer was given an allotment. 2° 8 Roscoe
Filburn, a dairy farmer in Ohio, grew wheat primarily for personal home consumption
and to feed his livestock. 20 9 He only intended to sell a small portion of the wheat, well
2 11
2 1° Filburn's allotment in 1941 was 222 bushels of wheat.
below his allotment.
Filbum grew 461 bushels of wheat and was fined $117. 2 12 Filbum claimed the AAA
was not constitutional as applied because his wheat was not part of interstate
2 13
commerce.
The farmer lost. The Court (per Justice Jackson) upheld the AAA and ruled
against Filburn. Rejecting distinctions between direct and indirect effects on commerce,
and between manufacture/production and commerce, Jackson found that homegrown
2 14
wheat could be regulated because it had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

201. Richard A. Epstein, ConstitutionalFaith and the Commerce Clause, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 167, 173
(1996).
202. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
203. Jones & Laughlin and Darby may have been the death of federalism; Wickard was its epitaph. See
Bork, supra n. 15, at 56; Currie, supra n. 15, at 238.
204. Oxford Companion,supra n. 15, at 1088.
205. See Redlich, Attanasio & Goldstein, ConstitutionalLaw, supra n. 89, at 132. "Two children, Rachel
and Josh, set up a neighborhood lemonade stand. After Wickard, could Congress regulate their prices? Does it
matter that their stand has, at most, a trivial effect on the economy?" Id.
206. Greve, supra n. 19, at 39.
207. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115. According to Epstein, the purpose of the wheat quotas permitted
by/established under the AAA was to "set and maintain prices for farmers well above the world level."
Epstein, supra n. 9, at 66.
208. Wickard,317 U.S. at115.
209. Id.
at 114.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 114-15.
213. Wickard, 377 U.S. at 113-14; see Cushman, supra n. 189, at 216-24. It is interesting to compare
Wickard with Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939). Mulford upheld the tobacco quota provisions of the AAA.
Mulford, 307 U.S. at 41, 51. In Mulford, there was ample evidence that the tobacco at issue was sold in
interstate commerce. Id. at 47-48. Justice Jackson (then Solicitor General Jackson) argued the case for the
United States Government. Id.at 41.
214. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29; Kmiec, supra n. 15, at 85.
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Even though Filbum's "own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by
itself [it] is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as
here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far
from trivial. ' 2 15 According to the Wickard Court, homegrown
wheat could account for
2 16
more than twenty percent of annual wheat production.
Five significant points must be made about Wickard. First, Wickard is a political
case-a case decided along party lines and a case about the distribution of political
power between branches of the federal government and between the state and federal
government. Wickard sends a clear signal that the Court will not review Congressional
exercises of the commerce power. Congress is given a free hand to determine the scope
2 17
and limits of the commerce power.
Second, Wickard utilizes a substantial effect test. 2 18 A regulation is a valid
exercise of the commerce power if it has a substantial effect on commerce. 2 19 This test
220
is a judicial construct-a matter of interpretation. It is not found in the Constitution.
Significantly, Congress decides when a regulation has a substantial effect on
commerce.221
Third, Wickard looks at the aggregate effect of the intrastate conduct or activity.
In his Wickard opinion, Justice Jackson acknowledges that the amount of wheat grown
by Filbum is insignificant. 2 22 To find a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
Jackson aggregates Filburn's wheat with all the other wheat grown for home
consumption. 22 3 In terms of the three-paradox model, Jackson relies on the Substantial
Paradox.
Fourth, Wickard invokes Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden:
"At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a
breadth never yet exceeded.",224 Marshall wrote:
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is

completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between
different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such
a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.

215. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
216. Id. at 127.
217. See White, supra n. 15, at 230-33, 231 nn. 95-96.
218. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
219. Seeid.
220. White traces the substantial effect test to Darby. See White, supra n. 15, at 228. At one point, the
Wickard Court thought about remanding the case for a determination of whether a substantial effect existed.
Id.; see Cushman, supra n. 189, 212-24; Hayek, supra n. 107, at 192 ("[1]n some respects the unwritten parts
of the Constitution are more instructive than its text.").
221. See e.g. White, supra n. 15, at 230-33.
222. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127.
223. Id. at 127-28.
224. Id. at 120 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-95). Professor Bruce Ackerman has observed that the
Roosevelt Justices commonly portrayed and characterized constitutional innovations as restatements of the
jurisprudence of Chief Justice Marshall. Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations vol. 1, 42-43
(Belknap Press 1991); see Epstein, supra n. 9, at 69-70 (arguing that Jackson mischaracterized Marshall's
opinion in Gibbons).
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Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more States than one.... The enumeration presupposes
or the subject of
something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language
2 25
the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.
22 6
Jackson stretches and
Marshall's successor Justices expanded the commerce power.
wheat that is never
expands Marshall's definition of "commerce" to include homegrown
227
sold, traded, or exchanged. Jackson uses the Commerce Paradox.
Fifth, Wickard does not simply rely on an expansive construction of the Commerce
228
This use is not
Clause. It also makes use of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
warranted. The Necessary and Proper Clause does not grant Congress a license229to
intrude upon intrastate activities. In other words, Jackson uses the Interstate Paradox.

Professor Barry Cushman offers the following observations about the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937 and the innovative Commerce Clause jurisprudence
represented by Wickard:
The fact that such a transformation of commerce clause jurisprudence coincided with
Roosevelt's bevy of new appointments to the Court brings to mind Max Planck's remark in
his Scientific Autobiography: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die,
and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it." It was the replacement of the Nine
Old Men with younger men who had more recently come to legal maturity-men who,
though not without difficulty, were able to break free of an older constitutional vocabulary
and embrace a new conception of the judicial function-that brought forth a new paradigm
for commerce clause jurisprudence. This-not the plot of the conventional story of
capitulation 3 0to external political pressure-was the "structure" of the constitutional
2

revolution.

225. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-95. This same passage was later quoted in Lopez. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553.
226. Currie, supra n. 129, at 170 ("[I]t was Marshall's successors who were to expand the commerce power
to cover virtually everything." (footnote omitted)).
227. According to Professors Nelson and Pushaw, Wickard
transformed the Commerce Clause by declaring that it not only included "commerce" (i.e.,
market-oriented activities), but also "economics" (i.e., anything that affects the quantity or price of
goods and services). Because virtually everything has an economic effect, Wickard enabled
Congress to regulate whatever it pleased-a point well understood by Justice Jackson, who wrote
the Court's opinion.
Nelson & Pushaw, supran. 15, at 82, 82 nn. 382-383 (footnotes omitted).
228. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119.
229. See id.; Barnett, supra n. 9, at 315. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452
U.S. 264 (1981), then-Justice Rehnquist explained the rationale of Wickard as follows:
[T]he Court expanded the scope of the Commerce Clause to include the regulation of acts which
taken alone might not have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, such as a wheat
farmer's own production, but which might reasonably be deemed nationally significant in their
cumulative effect, such as altering the supply-and-demand relationships in the interstate commodity
market.
Id. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). According to Professor Barnett, "[b]y this rationale the distinction
between interstate and intrastate commerce is destroyed." Barnett, supra n. 9, at 315; see also Epstein, supra
n. 9, at 70-71 (suggesting the same).
230. Cushman, supra n. 189, at 224 (footnote omitted, emphasis in original).
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The Roosevelt Justices used a new vocabulary, or a new dictionary, to read the
Constitution. That vocabulary included the three Commerce Clause paradoxes-a sort
of Orwellian double-speak: "Peace is War," "Black is White," "Interstate is Intrastate,"
23 1
"Substantial is Trivial," and "Commerce is Not Commerce."
232
In conventional accounts of constitutional history, this is the "happy ending."
The "good" Justices-the Roosevelt Justices-substituted a New Deal Commerce Clause
for the "horse-and-buggy" Commerce Clause vocabulary of the Nine Old Men,2 33 and
constitutional law emerged from the Dark Age of Lochner.234 The problem with the
conventional account is that it neglects the function and purpose of the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause was intended to facilitate economic growth, and it did
just that. During the watch of the Nine Old Men, the United States experienced an
economic miracle--"stupendous growth" 235 and, and after the publication of the

231. See George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 27 (Centennial ed., Plume 2003) (this text was originally
published in 1949). "The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the
world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc [i.e., English Socialism], but to make all other
modes of thought impossible." Id.at 309-10; see Posner, supran. 18, at 834 (referring to the "lexicographical
dictator" in Nineteen Eighty-Four-the character called "O'Brien").
232. Barnett, supra n. 9, at 354, 354 n. I ("Almost all constitutional analysts, as a matter of brute fact, seem
committed to a de facto theory of 'happy endings,' whereby one's skills as a rhetorical manipulator.., are
devoted to achieving satisfying results." (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)).
233. See Schwartz, supra n. 100, at 231-45. Professor Schwartz saw Darby, rather than Wickard, as the
crucial Commerce Clause case. Id.at 243 ("The Darby decision marks the culmination in the development of
the Commerce Clause as the source of a [national] police power.... Under Darby, Congress can utilize its
commerce power to suppress any commerce contrary to its broad conception of public interest."). According
to Schwartz, "[t]he national police power (as this aspect of the commerce power may be termed) is the plenary
power to secure any social, economic, or moral ends, so far as they may be obtained by the regulation of
commerce." Id. Professor Epstein identifies United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942), as
an important precursor of Wickard. Epstein, supra n. 9, at 67. In Wrightwood Dairy the Court held that
"Congress could restrict the sale of dairy products in intrastatecommerce because of the obvious effect that the
sales would have on the price of goods in interstate commerce." Id. (citing Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S.
at 125-26) (emphasis added).
234. See Oxford Companion, supra n. 15, at 588-91. In Lochner, the Court applied the doctrine of
substantive due process. Lochner symbolizes the Court's commitment to laissez-faire economics and gives its
name to an entire era of constitutional history. See Chemerinsky, supra n. 15, at 590-94, 592 n. 48; Fried,
supra n. 15, at 173-74, 182-83; Schwartz, supra n. 100, at 190 ("Aside from Dred Scott itself, Lochner v. New
York is now considered the most discredited decision in Supreme Court history." (footnote omitted)); Sunstein,
supra n. 189, at 50; Gardbaum, supran. 105, at 493.
The Roosevelt Justices fundamentally changed directions in the meaning of the Constitution. In effect,
the Roosevelt Justices amended the Constitution. Their interpretation of the Commerce Clause legitimized the
New Deal administrative agencies and allowed the development of the Bureaucratic State. If the Roosevelt
Justices were wrong, the New Deal agencies and their modem successor bureaucracies are unconstitutional.
See Ackerman, supra n. 224, at 44; Barnett, supra n. 9, at 108-10; Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private
Propertyand the Power of Eminent Domain 280-81 (Harv. 1985); Sunstein, supra n. 107, at 447-48 (arguing
the New Deal "altered the constitutional system in ways so fundamental as to suggest that something akin to a
constitutional amendment had taken place." (footnote omitted)); Tribe, supra n. 6, at 108 (describing
Ackerman's theories); Lawson, supra n. 107, at 1231 ("The post-New Deal administrative state is
unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional
revolution." (footnotes omitted) (quoted in Paul Edward Gottfried, After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the
Managerial State 67 (Princeton U. Press 1999))). Roosevelt considered using a formal constitutional
amendment to legitimize the New Deal. He rejected the idea because he did not think the amendment would be
approved. See Ackerman, supra n. 224, at 320-22; Barnett, supra n. 9, at 109; James MacGregor Bums,
Roosevelt, 1882-1940: The Lion and the Fox 295 (Harcourt 1956).
235. Liah Greenfeld, The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth 428 (Harvard U.
Press 2001). The "economic miracle" is a miracle in a loose sense-the same sense as the post-war economic
miracle in Japan. The economic miracle is associated with the laissez-faire capitalism that prevailed prior
to 1937 and "made America by the 1860s the largest free-trading area in the world." Johnson, supra n. 124,
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revisionist histories that are now the conventional account of the "Lochner era" and the
New Deal, "speedy and irreversible industrialization." 236 The so-called "Lochner era"
was not a "Dark Age" until the victors in the Constitutional Revolution of 1937-the
proponents of New Deal reforms-wrote their revisionist history and called the era
a "Dark Age. '
6.

237

After Wickard, federalism seemed dead.

The "New Federalism"

[S]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.

Justice William Rehnquist

2 38

Wickard's "epitaph of federalism" was premature. Wickard was called into
239
v. Usery,
question by three decisions in the modem era. In NationalLeague of Cities
the Court invalidated a federal wage and hour statute on federalism grounds.
In particular, the Court held that the federal statute violated an essential attribute of state
24
Usery was reversed by Garcia v.
sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment.
24 1
Authority.
Transit
San Antonio Metropolitan
The leading cases of the "New Federalism"-Lopez and Morrison-also called
Wickard into question. By a five-to-four vote, Lopez struck down a federal statute that
242
Lopez marked the first time the
made it a crime to possess a firearm in a school zone.

Court had invalidated a federal statute on Commerce Clause grounds in over fifty
years. 243

By another five-to-four vote, Morrison struck a federal statute that

at 532. But this laissez-faire system was not pure. It was accompanied by high external tariffs and by
government subsidies to railroads. Id. at 532-34. Epstein speaks of the "Progressive caricature" of the Nine
Old Men as a laissez-faire court. Epstein, supra n. 9, at 12. The Great Depression, of course, also occurred
during the watch of the Nine Old Men. Any credit they are due for the economic miracle must be offset by
blame for the Great Depression. According to the conventional account of the constitutional history of the
New Deal, the Court collectively experienced some sort of enlightenment or awakening (e.g., nirvana, satori) at
the time of the "switch in time that saved nine." See e.g. Schwartz, supra n. 100, at 231-39. The conventional
account has been criticized. See Cushman, supra n. 189, at chs. 1-2, 12; White, supra n. 15, at chs. 7, 10.
White and Cushman argue that the Court would have changed its jurisprudential approach from laissez-faire
formalism to Legal Realism even without the incentive provided by Roosevelt's Court-packing plan.
Cushman, supra n. 189, at chs. 1-2, 12; White, supra n. 15, at chs. 7, 10. The White-Cushman thesis is not
new. See Hofstadter, supra n. 189, at 311-12.
236. Greenfeld, supra n. 235, at 428.
237. See id. at 428-72; Epstein, supra n. 9, at 6. The progress during the Lochner era was not exclusively
material. The average work week for manufacturing industries shrank from fifty-nine hours in 1900 to just
over fifty hours in 1926. Epstein, supra n. 9, at 6. The hourly wage for workers in the manufacturing
industries increased from $0.21 to just over $0.64 in the same period. Id. Life expectancy increased from
forty-seven years in 1900 to nearly sixty in 1930. Id.
238. Tribe, supra n. 6 at 817 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)) (bracket added, internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
239. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
240. Id. at pt. 11; see Barnett, supra n. 9, at 317; Fried, supra n. 15, at 34; Oxford Companion, supra n. 15,
at 665; Tribe, supra n. 6, at 863-68.
241. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
242. 514U.S.at551.
243. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, in Martin H. Belsky,
The Rehnquist Court: A Retrospective 195, 197 (Oxford U. Press 2002) (arguing that for the "first time in sixty
years" the Court held a federal law as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause authority); Chemerinsky,
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criminalized acts of violence against or upon a female victim. 244 The two statutes
violated the Commerce Clause because they regulated activities that did not have
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Although Lopez and Morrison nominally
adhered to the substantial effect test of Wickard, these decisions modified the Wickard
test in two ways. First, the Lopez-Morrison Courts did not defer to Congress. By
actually overturning federal statutes on Commerce Clause grounds,
the Courts departed
24 5
from the Wickard approach of extreme deference to Congress.
24 6
Second, the Lopez-Morrison Courts applied the substantial effect test literally.
A substantial effect had to be substantial. The Court rejected the reasoning of cases
decided between 1937 and 1994 that "allow[ed] Congress to regulate a class of intrastate
247
activities that had only an insignificant, or trivial, effect on interstate commerce."
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized Wickard Justice William 0. Douglas for
accepting trivial conduct as an excuse for regulation-for reading Wickard too
broadly. 24 Rehnquist clearly rejected the Substantial Paradox.
In his Lopez concurrence, Justice Thomas criticized Wickard for misreading John
Marshall's opinion in Gibbons.249 According to Thomas, Marshall understood that
intrastate commerce would be regulated by states, not the federal government. Thomas
rejected the Interstate Paradox.
Significantly, Lopez and Morrison did not expressly overrule Wickard in the way
that Darby overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart(or the way Garcia overruled Usery). The
cases raised questions about Wickard. When Raich came on for decision by the Court,
Wickard was still the law.
IV.

RAICH AND WICKARD WERE DECIDED INCORRECTLY: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
DOES NOT REACH INTRASTATE NONCOMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

A.

Wickard and Raich Use an Overly Expansive Definition of "Commerce":
The Commerce Paradox

Both Wickard and Raich were decided incorrectly. Neither case involved
"commerce" as that term is used in the text of the Commerce Clause. Both cases used
the Commerce Paradox ("commerce is not commerce") to misinterpret the Constitution.

supran. 15, at 239; Greve, supra n. 19, at 19 (arguing that for the "first time in six decades" the Court held a
federal law as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause authority); The Heritage Guide to the Constitution,
supran. 19, at 104; see Epstein, supra n. 9, at 75.
244. 529 U.S. at 601-02; see Epstein, supra n. 9, at 75.
245. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607-27; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (majority); Fried, supra n. 15, at 30-32;
Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 177; Tribe, supran. 6, at 817-24.
246. E.g. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66.
247. Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at 177. The "insignificant/trivial" approach to the substantial effect
test is captured in a remark of Justice Robert Jackson's: "If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does
not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze." U.S. v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336
U.S. 460,464 (1949).

248. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 560-61.
249. See id at 594 (Thomas, J., concurring); but see id at 568-83 (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring)
(saying that Wickard and its progeny are not called into question). Lopez says the test is whether the regulated
activity substantially effects interstate commerce, but that the test is an actual test to be applied by courts, not a
proforma test to be applied by Congress. Id.at 559, 565.
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Both cases interpreted commerce in a manner that is so broad and expansive that it
included all economic activity, and perhaps all "intercourse." 250 Raich involved the
personal and private use of marijuana; there were no purchases or sales of marijuana.
The argument that commerce is limited to "trade or exchange" is amply supported
by a number of sources. Those sources include (1) modem and eighteenth century
dictionary definitions, (2) other provisions of the text of the Constitution, (3) The
Federalist Papers, (4) George Washington's Farewell Address, (5) the correspondence
of John Adams, (6) the essays of David Hume, and (7) the works of Edmond Burke.
Each of these sources is examined in turn.
1.

Dictionary Definitions

In contemporary usage, the primary meaning of "commerce" is "[t]he exchange of
goods and services, [especially] on a large scale involving transportation between cities,
states, and nations." 2 51 The same definition was used at the time the Constitution was
(e.g., Samuel Johnson's dictionary)
drafted and ratified. Eighteenth-century dictionaries
2 52
also defined commerce in terms of exchange.
2.

Other Provisions of the Text of the Constitution

According to Barnett, "[t]he first place to look for the original meaning of the text
is the text itself, both the immediate text at issue and any other text in the Constitution
The Constitution can
that may shed light on the meaning of the relevant portion." 253 255
254 on the meaning of particular terms.
serve as "its own dictionary
The Commerce Clause at issue in Wickard and Raich is the Interstate Commerce
Clause. 256 It is part of article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution:
The Congress shall have the Power [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
The Interstate Commerce Clause, then, is not the only Commerce Clause. There is
also an Indian Commerce Clause 257 and a Foreign Commerce Clause. 2 58 There is no

250. Barnett, supra n. 9, at 295, 312-17; The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, supra n. 19, at 102.
Professor Amar proposes that "commerce" may have a "broader meaning" that embraces "all forms of
intercourse in the affairs of life, whether or not narrowly economic or mediated by explicit markets." Amar,
supra n. 93, at 107. Without such a broad definition, it is not clear-to Professor Amar-where "the federal
government would derive its needed power to deal with noneconomic international incidents--or for that
matter to address the entire range of vexing nonmercantile interactions and altercations that might arise among
states." Id. at 108 (footnote omitted).
251. Black's Law Dictionary 285 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004); see Merriam-Webster's
CollegiateDictionary,supra n. 7, at 231.
252. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-86; see Barnett, supran. 9, at 280; Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the
Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1395 (1987).
253. Barnett, supran. 9, at 278-79.
254. Id. at 279.
255. Id. at 278-79.
256. See e.g. Keith E. Whittington, "Clothed with the Legitimate Authority of the People," 91 Va. L.
Rev. 2023, 2045 (2005).
257. See e.g. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 Harv. L.
Rev. 431, 441-42, 471 (2005).
258. See e.g. William Michael Treanor, JudicialReview Before Marbury, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 521 (2005).
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reason to believe that "commerce" means something different in the Indian Commerce
Clause and/or the Foreign Commerce Clause. 259 If commerce has a broad and expansive
meaning (e.g., "intercourse" or "all gainful activity") then the Foreign Commerce Clause
and the Indian Commerce Clause would, in theory, authorize Congress to interfere with
the intercourse or economic activity of other sovereign nations (e.g., Great Britain or the
Cherokee Nation). That sort of broad power could never have been intended. The
narrower construction of "commerce" as "trade or exchange" does not invite or authorize
interference with the sovereignty of other nations, and seems a more natural and
reasonable reading of the Indian Commerce Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause.
Another part of article I-the "Port Preference Clause"-provides in pertinent part
that: "No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the
Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State,
be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another." 26° As used in the Port Preference

Clause, "commerce" clearly means trade or exchange. The broad and expansive
meanings (e.g., "intercourse," "economic activity") would include "revenue" and make it
26 1
unnecessary to reference revenue separately.
3.

The FederalistPapers

The FederalistPapers were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay in 1787 and 1788 to build support for the Constitution during the ratification
debates. 2 62 Jefferson called The Federalist "the best commentary on the principles of
government, which was ever written." 263 Churchill called The Federalist "brilliant
264
propaganda."
The Federalist uses a narrow definition of "commerce." In Federalist No. 11,
Hamilton equates "commerce" with the "carrying trade"265-"transportation of goods

259. See Barnett, supra n. 9, at 279. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall thought that "the word 'commerce' as
applied to commerce among the several states had to have the same meaning as the word 'commerce' as
applied to foreign commerce." Epstein, supra n. 9, at 26; see id. at 29 (discussing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190,
193-94).
260. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. The approach to interpretation that focuses on uses of the same term in
different provisions of the same document is called "intratextualism." See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,
112 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 789-92 (1999). Justice Thomas discusses the Port Preference Clause in his Lopez
concurrence. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring).
261. Barnett, supra n. 9, at 279; Epstein, supra n. 252, at 1395 ("The term 'commerce' is used in opposition
to the term 'revenue,' and seems clearly to refer to shipping and its incidental activities; this much seems
evident from the use of the term 'port."').
262. Charles R. Kesler, Introduction, in Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The Federalist Papers, supra n. 95,
at viii.
263. Id. at ix (internal quotation marks omitted); Gottfried Dietze, The Federalist:A Classic on Federalism
and Free Government 5, 5 n. 5 (John Hopkins U. Press 1960).
264. Winston S. Churchill, A History of the English-SpeakingPeoples: The Age of Revolution 257 (Barnes &
Noble Bks. 1956). The FederalistPapers have been cited by the Supreme Court approximately three-hundred
times. See e.g. Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 260 (Penguin Press 2004) ("By the year 2000, it [i.e., The
Federalist Papers] had been quoted no fewer than 291 times in Supreme Court opinions, with the frequency of
citations rising with the years.").
265. Alexander Hamilton, FederalistNo. I/, in Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The Federalist Papers, supra
n. 95, at 79.
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from one country to another."
commodities and to trade.
and agriculture.

268

26 7

It is

266

Hamilton also equates commerce to the sale of

In FederalistNo. 12, he distinguishes between commerce
true

"intercourse" interchangeably.

269

that Hamilton

sometimes

uses

"commerce"

and

When he does it, it is always clear that he means

2 70

Madison discusses the Commerce Clause specifically in Federalist No.
2
42.271 It is plain that he understands "commerce" to mean "trade." 72 In fact, according
to Barnett, "[i]n none of the sixty-three appearances of the term 'commerce' in The
"trade."

Federalist is it ever used to refer unambiguously to any activity beyond trade or
2 73

exchange."

4.

George Washington's Farewell Address

Churchill called George

Washington's

celebrated [documents] in American history."

274

Farewell Address

"one

of the most

In his Farewell Address, Washington

recognized "commerce" as a kind of "intercourse," but drew distinctions between
commerce and manufacturing:

266. Id.at 571 (emphasis added); see also id.at 41. Barnett quotes the following excerpt from Federalist
No. 11:
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an
interchange of their respective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but
for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished and
will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part.
Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope from the diversity in the productions of
different States.
Barnett, supra n. 9, at 281 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
267. Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The FederalistPapers,supra n. 95, at 83.
268. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 12, in Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The Federalist Papers, supra
n. 95, at 86-91; see Barnett, supra n. 9, at 281.
269. Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The FederalistPapers,supra n. 95, at 139-40.
270. Id.Professor Barnett comments:
In Federalist 21, Hamilton maintained that causes of the wealth of nations were of "an infinite
variety," including "[s]ituation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the nature of the
government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of information they possess, the state of
commerce, of arts, of industry."
Barnett, supra n. 9, at 281 (bracket in original, emphasis added, footnote omitted). In Federalist No. 35,
Hamilton asked: "Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the
interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts to which his commerce is so nearly allied?" Id. (footnote
omitted). Barnett finds Hamilton's use of "commerce" in a narrow, restrictive sense to be especially significant
because Hamilton was a "proponent of broad national powers." Id.
271. Madison, FederalistNo. 42, in Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The FederalistPapers, supra n. 95, at 260.
272. Id. at 264. On this, Madison remarks, id.:
To those who do not view the question through the medium of passion or of interest, the desire of
the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial
neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party,
by resentment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade.
273. Bamett, supra n. 9,at 281.
274. Churchill, supra n. 264, at 346-47. Alexander Hamilton helped Washington with the text--"The result
is an encapsulation of what the first President thought America was, or ought to be, about." Johnson, supra
n. 124, at 228; see Chemow, supra n. 264, at 505-08; Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of
Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800, at 490-97 (Oxford U. Press 1993) (discussing
Washington's Farewell Address).
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The North, in an unrestrained intercourse with the South, protected by the equal Laws
of a common government, finds in the productions of the latter, great additional resources
of Maratime and commercial enterprise and precious materials of manufacturing industry.
The South in the same Intercourse, benefiting by the Agency of the North, sees its
agriculture grow and its commerce expand. Turning partly into its own channels the
seamen of the North, it finds its particular navigation envigorated; and while it contributes,
in different ways, to nourish and increase the general mass of the National navigation, it
looks forward to the protection of a Maratime strength, to which itself is unequally adapted.
The East, in a like intercourse with the West, already finds, and in the progressive
improvement of interior communications, by land and water, will more and more find a
valuable vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad, or manufactures at home.
The West derives from the East supplies requisite to its growth and comfort, and what is
perhaps of still greater consequence, it must of necessity owe the secure enjoyment of
indispensable outlets for its own productions to the weight, influence, and the future
Maritime strength of the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble community
of Interest as one Nation. Any other tenure by which the West can hold this essential
advantage, whether derived from its own separate strength, or from an apostate and
unnatural connection with any foreign Power, must be intrinsically precarious.
Washington also distinguished between "commercial relations" and "political
connections": "The Great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations is in
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as
' 27 6
possible.
Washington saw "commercial policy" as the regulation of "merchants":
Harmony, liberal intercourse with all Nations, are recommended by policy, humanity
and interest. But even our Commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand:
neither seeking nor granting exclusive favours or preferences; consulting the natural course
of things; diffusing and deversifying by gentle means the streams of Commerce, but
forcing nothing; establishing with Powers so disposed[,] in order to give to trade a stable
course, to define the rights of our Merchants, and to enable the Government to support
them; conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual
opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied,
as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view, that 'tis folly in
one Nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of
its Independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such acceptance,
it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favours and yet
of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error
than to expect, or calculate upon real favours from Nation to Nation. 'Tis an illusion which

275. George Washington, Farewell Address, in John Marshall, The Life of George Washington 487, 490

(Robert Faulkner & Paul Carrese eds., spec. ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2000) (emphasis in original). Chernow
summarizes the quoted passage as follows: "Agriculture and commerce were mutually beneficial. North and
south, the western frontier and the eastern seaboard, enjoyed complementary economies." Chemow, supra
n. 264, at 507.
276. Marshall, supra n. 275, at 498 (emphasis in original). This "rule," of course, is a variant of
Washington's advice to avoid foreign entanglements.
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experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.

2 77

Clearly, Washington saw "commerce" as "trade or exchange."
5.

The Correspondence of John Adams

On May 12, 1780, John Adams wrote his wife Abigail from Paris. 27 8 The letter is
justly famous for a single line: "I must study Politicks and War that my sons may have
liberty to study Mathematicks and Philosophy." 279 The passage in which that line
appears makes it clear that Adams understood commerce in a narrow sense, and
distinguished between commerce and agriculture. Adams wrote:
To take a Walk in the Gardens of the Palace of the Tuilleries, and describe the Statues
there, all in marble, in which the ancient Divinities and Heroes are represented with
exquisite Art, would be a very pleasant Amusement, and instructive Entertainment,
improving in History, Mythology, Poetry, as well as in Statuary. Another Walk in the
Gardens of Versailles, would be usefull and agreable.-But to observe these Objects with
Taste and describe them so as to be understood, would require more time and thought than
I can possibly Spare. It is not indeed the fine Arts, which our Country requires. The
Usefull, the mechanic Arts, are those which We have occasion for in a young Country, as
yet simple and not far advanced in Luxury, altho perhaps much too far for her Age and
Character.
I could fill Volumes with Descriptions of Temples and Palaces, Paintings, Sculptures,
Tapestry, Porcelaine, &c. &c. &c.-ifI could have time. But I could not do this without
neglecting my duty.-The Science of Government it is my Duty to study, more than all
other Sciences: the Art of Legislation and Administration and Negotiation, ought to take
Place, indeed to exclude in a manner all other Arts.-I must study Politicks and War that
my sons may have liberty to study Mathematicks and Philosophy. My sons ought to study
Mathematicks and Philosophy, Geography, natural History, Naval Architecture,
navigation, Commerce and Agriculture, in order to give their Children 280
a right to study
Painting, Poetry, Musick, Architecture, Statuary, Tapestry and Porcelaine.
6.

The Essays of David Hume

The Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume wrote a popular series of
essays in the mid-1700s. The essays were read and appreciated by educated men on both
28 1
sides of the Atlantic.

277. Id.at 498-99 (bracket in original). On December 7, 1796, Washington made his final speech to
Congress. Inthat speech, Washington expressed the following thought: "To an active external commerce, the
protection of a naval force is indispensable." Id. at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted).
278. Ltr. from John Adams to Abigail Adams, in Adams Family Correspondence vol. 3, 341 (L. H.
Butterfield & Marc Friedlaender eds., Belknap Press 1973).
279. Id. at 342.
280. Id. (quoted in Will, supra n. 9, at 36). Adam's biographer, David McCullough, describes the quoted
passage as a "prophetic paragraph that would be quoted for generations within the Adams family and beyond."
David McCullough, John Adams 236 (Simon & Schuster 2001).
281. See e.g. Alexander Hamilton, FederalistNo. 85, in Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The FederalistPapers,
supra n. 95, at 520, 526; McCullough, supra n. 280, at 121, 377; Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient & Modern:
Inventions of Prudence: Constituting the American Regime vol. 3 (UNC Press 1994); Gordon S. Wood, The
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Hume understood the term "commerce" to mean "trade or exchange." In his essay
Of Commerce, Hume wrote:
The greatness of a state, and the happiness of its subjects, how independent soever
they may be supposed in some respects, are commonly allowed to be inseparable with
regard to commerce; and as private men receive greater security, in the possession of their
trade and riches, from the power of the public, so the public becomes powerful in
proportion to the opulence and extensive commerce of private men. This maxim is true in
general; though I cannot forbear thinking, that it may possibly admit of exceptions, and that
we often establish it with too little reserve and limitation. There may be some
circumstances, where the commerce and riches and luxury of individuals, instead of adding
strength to the public, will
serve only to thin its armies, and diminish its authority among
2 82
the neighbouring nations.
Hume continued:
If we consult history, we shall find, that, in most nations, foreign trade has preceded
any refinement in home manufactures, and given birth to domestic luxury. The temptation
is stronger to make use of foreign commodities, which are ready for use, and which are
entirely new to us, than to make improvements on any domestic commodity, which always
advance by slow degrees, and never affect us by their novelty. The profit is also very
great, in exporting what is superfluous at home, and what bears no price, to foreign nations,
whose soil or climate is not favourable to that commodity. Thus men become acquainted
with the pleasures of luxury and the profits of commerce; and their delicacy and industry,
being once awakened, carry them on to farther improvements, in every branch of domestic
as well as foreign trade. And this perhaps is the chief advantage which arises from a
commerce with strangers. It rouses men from their indolence; and presenting the gayer and
more opulent part of the nation with objects of luxury, which they never before dreamed
of, raises in
them a desire of a more splendid way of life than what their ancestors
28 3
enjoyed.
7.

The Works of Edmund Burke

The founders-both Federalists and Anti-Federalists-were Whigs.

Edmund

Burke, the most famous British parliamentarian of the eighteenth century, was the
intellectual leader of the Whigs. According to Churchill, Burke was a "great political

Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 14 (UNC 1998); see also A Companion to Epistemology,
supra n. 7, at 182-84 (describing Hume's epistemology).
282. David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary 255 (Eugene F. Miller ed., rev. ed., Liberty Fund,
Inc. 1985).
283. Id. at 263-64 (emphasis in original). J.G.A. Pocock explains Hume's theory regarding commerce as
follows:
Commerce and leaming ...had effected more than a trivial transition from the superstition of
medieval Christians to the fanaticism of the Puritans. They had enlarged men's ideas by giving
them more objects to feed upon, more concepts to entertain and more values to express [and] had
facilitated a growth in the rational capacities.
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican

Tradition 494 (Princeton U. Press 1975); see Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation:The Science of
Freedom 357-59 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1969). Hume's fellow Scot, Adam Smith, called Hume "by far the
most illustrious philosopher and historian of the present age." Id. at 359 (internal quotation marks and footnote
omitted).
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thinker," "[a]n orator to be named with the ancients," who might have been "Britain's
greatest statesman" (but was not).2 8 4 Significantly, Burke was one of the great writers
and conversationalists of the late 1700s; his use of language was exemplary. Chief
285
Justice Marshall was a particular admirer of Burke's.
Burke used "commerce" in the narrow sense of "trade or exchange." Burke wrote:

Even commerce, and trade, and manufacture, the gods of our economic politicians, are
themselves perhaps but creatures; are themselves but effects, which, as first causes, we
choose to worship. They certainly grew under the same shade in which learning flourished.
They too may decay with their natural protecting principles. With you, for the present at
least, they all threaten to disappear together. Where trade and manufactures are wanting to
a people, and the spirit of nobility and religion remains, sentiment supplies, and not always
ill supplies, their place; but if commerce and the arts should be lost in an experiment to try
how well a state may stand without these old fundamental principles, what sort of a thing
must be a nation of gross, stupid, ferocious, and, at the same time, poor and sordid,

barbarians, destitute of religion,
honour, or manly pride, possessing nothing at present, and
286
hoping for nothing hereafter?

284. Churchill, supra n. 264, at 173-74. Jacques Barzun called Burke "[t]he greatest political thinker of the
late [eighteenth century]." Jacques Barzun, From Dawn To Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural
Life, 1500 to the Present 520 (Perennial 2000); Johnson, supra n. 124, at 157 ("Edmund Burke, the greatest
statesman in Britain at that time, and the only one fit to rank with Franklin, Jefferson, Washington, Adams, and
Madison.").
285. According to "The Club"-the men of letters who dined together at the Turk's Head in Soho-Burke
was the only person who could match Samuel Johnson as a brilliant conversationalist. See Conor Cruise
O'Brien, The Great Melody: A Thematic Biography and Commented Anthology of Edmund Burke xxxv, 101
(U. Chi. Press 1992). The title of O'Connor's book, The Great Melody, comes from a line in poem called "The
Seven Stages" by W.B. Yeats:
American colonies, Ireland, France and India, Harried, and Burke's great melody against it.
O'Brien, supra, at xix. The great causes and issues of Burke's parliamentary eloquence and political career
were American independence, Irish liberty, the French Revolution, and the colonial administration of India. Id.
at 96. The "it" that was the subject of Burke's "Great Melody" was "abuse of power," or tyranny. Id.; see
Johnson, supra n. 124, at 157 (noting Burke's "public life was devoted to essentially a single theme-the
exposure and castigation of the abuse of power."). Samuel Johnson stood "in awe" of Burke. O'Brien, supra,
at 101. Johnson admired Burke "intellectually more than any other he knew." W. Jackson Bate, Samuel
Johnson 447 (Counterpoint 1998). Johnson called Burke "the first man everywhere" and "a great man by
nature." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Edward Gibbon, author of The History of The Decline and
Fall of the Roman Empire (Harper & Bros. 1905), professed the highest admiration for Burke: "I admire his
eloquence, I approve his politics, I adore his chivalry, and I can almost excuse his reverence for church
establishments." Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and American
Enlightenments 72 (Alfred A. Knopf 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Adam Smith, the founder of the
discipline of economics, supposedly told Burke, after a discussion of economics, that "[Burke] was the only
man who, without communication, thought on these topics exactly as [Smith] did." Id. at 73 (brackets in
original, footnote omitted). Russell Kirk points out that "much of the account of the American Revolution in
John Marshall's Life of Washington is lifted from Burke's Annual Register." Russell Kirk, Redeeming the
Time 234, 264-65 (Jeffrey 0. Nelson ed., Intercollegiate Stud. Inst. 1998).
286. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 68 (Frank M. Turner ed., Yale U. Press 2003).
The reference to commerce, trade, and manufacture as the "gods of our economic politicians" is evocative of
the most famous passage in Burke's Reflections-the passage in which he "makes love" to Marie Antoinette
and laments that the "age of chivalry is gone" and "that of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has
succeeded.":
It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France, then the dauphiness, at
Versailles; and surely never lighted on this orb, which she hardly [seemed] to touch, a more
delightful vision. I saw her just above the horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she
just began to move in,-glittering like the morning-star, full of life, and splendour, and joy. Oh!
what a revolution! and what a heart must I have to contemplate without emotion that elevation and
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Burke continued:
I see a practice perfectly correspondent to their contempt of this great fundamental part of
natural law. I see the confiscators begin with bishops, and chapters, and monasteries; but I
do not see them end there. I see the princes of the blood, who, by the oldest usages of that
kingdom, held large landed estates, (hardly with the compliment of a debate,) deprived of
their possessions, and, in lieu of their stable, independent property, reduced to the hope of
some precarious, charitable pension, at the pleasure of an assembly, which of course will
pay little regard to the rights of pensioners at pleasure, when it despises those of legal
proprietors. Flushed with the insolence of their first inglorious victories, and pressed by
the distresses caused by their lust of unhallowed lucre, disappointed but not discouraged,
they have at length ventured completely to subvert all property of all descriptions
throughout the extent of a great kingdom. They have compelled all men, in all transactions
of commerce, in the disposal of lands, in civil dealing, and through the whole communion
of life, to accept as perfect payment and good287and lawful tender, the symbols of their
speculations on a projected sale of their plunder.

that fall! Little did I dream when she added titles of veneration to those of enthusiastic, distant,
respectful love, that she should ever be obliged to carry the sharp antidote against disgrace
concealed in that bosom; little did I dream that I should have lived to see such disasters fallen upon
her in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of honour, and of cavaliers. I thought ten
thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her
with insult. But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculatorshas
succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguishedfor ever. Never, never more shall we behold
that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that
subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted
freedom. The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment
and heroic enterprise, is gone! It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which
felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled
whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness.
Id. at 65 (emphasis added); see Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 21 (Yale U. Press 1975)
(quoting from the passage, describing it as the passage that Tom Paine "tellingly picked up [in Rights of Man]
in which Burke makes love to Marie Antoinette"). "With this passage, ... 'the Romantic Movement in English
literature had begun."' Id. (quoting Sir Philip Magnus) (footnote omitted).
In a very real sense, Burke laments the replacement of The Age of Chivalry by The Age of Commerce
(e.g., the age of sophisters, economists, and calculators). See Will, supra n. 9, at 119; see generally O'Brien,
supra n. 285, at 406-09 (discussing the "queen of France" passage). The Age of Chivalry was an age that
celebrated public virtue and its surrogate, personal honor. The Age of Commerce is an age that is dedicated to
material wealth and consumption-to the proposition that "more is better." The Age of Commerce emphasizes
individual self-interest. George Will has written:
Drawing upon Montesquieu, many Founders thought that commerce-the submersion of passion
and interest in pursuit of private gain-was more reliable than public virtue as a basis of political
stability. But real conservatives have said it well and often: Democracy subverts itself if it subverts

the habits of self-restraint, self-denial and public-spiritedness. That danger defines the drama of
democracy in a commercial nation, a nation devoted to inflaming and satisfying appetites.
Will, supran. 6, at 133.
Conservatives-especially Burkeans-are ambivalent about commerce. Commerce can be vulgar and
greedy, but it can also advance human knowledge and promote human excellence. See David Lowenthal,
Montesquieu, 1689-1755, in History of PoliticalPhilosophy 513, 531 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d

ed., U. Chi. Press 1987).

Conservatives and Burkeans prefer citizens to have sincere and genuine

public-spiritedness and self-discipline. Will, supra n. 6, at 133. The Founders devised a way to simulate
public-spiritedness by setting self-interest against self-interest. Id. "Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition." James Madison, FederalistNo. 51, in Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The Federalist Papers, supra
n. 95, at 319.
287. Burke, supra n. 286, at 128.
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Plainly, Burke sees commercial conduct as economic conduct. Burke does not endorse a
broad definition that would include all human activity within the ambit and scope of
"commerce."
B.

There is no Transaction in Interstate Commerce: The "Interstate Paradox"

Assume arguendo that the homegrown wheat in Wickard and the homegrown
marijuana in Raich are in "commerce." As suggested above, some eighteenth century
literature suggests "commerce" means "intercourse." 288 Intercourse is broad enough and
vague enough to include anything. If the wheat in Wickard and the marijuana in Raich
are commerce, they are still beyond the reach of Congress's commerce power. That
power only extends to "Commerce among the States." Neither Wickard nor Raich
involve interstate transactions-no state lines are crossed directly or indirectly. There is
no transaction in interstate commerce-unless one uses the Interstate Paradox as an
interpretive tool to stretch the meaning of "interstate" (i.e., "Interstate means intrastate").
Even if the commerce power itself does not reach the intrastate conduct in Wickard
and Raich, it can be argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause expands and expends
the scope of the commerce power to include intrastate transactions. The notion is that
the CSA, as a whole, is a valid exercise of the commerce power and that regulation of
289
intrastate wheat and marijuana is essential to that exercise.
The argument predicated upon the Necessary and Proper Clause must fail. As
Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, "Congress may not use its incidental authority
to subvert basic principles of federalism and dual sovereignty. ' 2 9° The Necessary and
Proper Clause-also called the "Sweeping Clause"--does not enlarge or expand the
limited and enumerated powers granted to Congress. 291 As Chief Justice Marshall made
clear in McCulloch v. Maryland,the Necessary and Proper Clause should not be used as
292
a "pretext ...for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government."
If the Necessary and Proper Clause does not expand the scope of Congress's
power, what does it do? It does nothing. The Necessary and Proper Clause is-as
Alexander Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 33-a "tautology" and a
"redundancy." 293

288. See Amar, supra n. 93, at 107-08; see also supra nn. 119 and 250 and accompanying text. According
to Professor Amar, "commerce" had "in 1787, and retains even now, a broader meaning referring to all forms
of intercourse in the affairs of life, whether or not narrowly economic or mediated by explicit markets." Id.
at 107. Amar's argument is very problematic. Such a broad definition of "commerce," by its terms, could not
limit or restrict Congressional power. Interestingly, Amar predicates his argument on Viscount Bolingbroke's
"famous mid-eighteenth-century tract, The Idea of a PatriotKing." Id. Amar is impressed by the fact that
Bolingbroke spoke of the "free and easy commerce of social life." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ironically, Burke answered Amar's argument over two hundred years ago, in Reflections on the Revolutions in
France, when he asked: "Who now reads Bolingbroke? Who ever read him through?" Burke, supra n. 286,
at 76.
289. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring).
290. Id. at 2234 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
291. See Barnett, supra n. 9, at 154-90; Epstein, supra n. 9, at 71 ("[Any broad reading of the Necessary
and Proper Clause-one that expands the ends Congress may pursue-makes pointless the entire system of
enumerated powers of which the Necessary and Proper Clause is the last.").
292. Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2234 (quoting McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819)).
293. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 33, in Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The Federalist Papers, supra
n. 95, at 199. Hamilton's remarks concerning the Necessary and Proper Clause are especially apt:
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The Raich majority combines a broad and expansive definition of commerce with a
broad and expansive reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The result is a
national police power so broad and sweeping that it can be called a "blank check ' 294 or a
"license to kill."'295 The problem with the Raich/Wickard approach is that it proves too
much. If "commerce" means all economic activity, and the Necessary and Proper Clause
extends the power to noneconomic activity (including intrastate activity) having a
substantial impact on interstate commerce, then it is unnecessary to grant Congress any
other powers to regulate economic activity. The Raich/Wickard approach makes the
' 296
enumeration of powers in article I, section 8 of the Constitution "wholly superfluous."
Justice Thomas has cataloged the powers that are rendered superfluous by the
Raich/Wickardinterpretation of the Commerce Clause:
[I]f Congress may regulate all matters that substantially affect commerce, there is no need
for the Constitution to specify that Congress may enact bankruptcy laws, cl. 4, or coin
money and fix the standard of weights and measures, cl. 5, or punish counterfeiters of
United States coin and securities, cl. 6. Likewise, Congress would not need the separate
authority to establish post offices and post roads, cl. 7, or to grant patents and copyrights,
cl.8, or to "punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas," cl. 10. It might not
even need the power to raise and support an Army and Navy, cls. 12 and 13, for fewer
people would engage in commercial shipping if they thought that a foreign power could
expropriate their property with ease.

Indeed, if Congress could regulate matters that

substantially affect interstate commerce, there would have been no need to specify that

The last clause of the eighth section of the first article authorizes the national legislature "to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers by that
Constitution vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof";
and the second clause of the sixth article declares that "the Constitution and the laws of the United
States made in pursuance thereofand the treaties made by their authority shall be the supreme law
of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
These two clauses have been the source of much virulent invective and petulant declamation
against the proposed Constitution. They have been held up to the people in all the exaggerated
colors of misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be
destroyed and their liberties exterminated; as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would
spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor scared nor profane; and yet, strange as it may
appear, after all this clamor, to those who may not have happened to contemplate them in the same
light, it may be affirmed with perfect confidence that the constitutional operation of the intended
government would be precisely the same if these clauses were entirely obliterated as if they were
repeated in every article. They are only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by
necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a federal government and
vesting it with certain specified powers. This is so clear a proposition that moderation itself can
scarcely listen to the railings which have been so copiously vented against this part of the plan
without emotions that disturb its equanimity.
Id.at 197-98 (emphasis in original). Hamilton may have taken a more expansive view of the Necessary and
Proper Clause when he proposed the Bank of the United States. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning
of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 183, 196-98 (2003); compare Tribe, supra n. 6, at
§ 5-3 (suggesting that the Necessary and Proper Clause should be read more broadly than Madison proposed
and suggesting that there may be implied or inherent legislative powers); see also Fried, supra n. 15, at 19-21.
"[T]he Sweeping Clause is an admonition to interpret the enumerated powers generously." Fried, supra n. 15,
at 21; see Epstein, supra n. 9, at 70-71 (suggesting the same).
294. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Thomas, J., concurring)
295. The fictional British Secret Service agent, James Bond ("007"), was granted a license to kill. E.g. Ian
Fleming, Goldfinger 003 (Penguin Bks. 2002) (originally published in 1959).
296. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588.
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Congress can regulate international trade and commerce with the Indians. As the Framers
surely understood, these other branches of trade substantially affect interstate
297
commerce.
In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall described the Constitution as "one of
enumeration, and not of definition." 29 8 "This instrument [i.e., the Constitution] contains
29 9
an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government."
300
According to Marshall, "[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated."
The broad, virtually all-encompassing power endorsed by Wickard and Raich leaves
nothing un-enumerated; it occupies virtually the entire field of legislative-indeed,
governmental-activity. The point bears emphasis: the all-encompassing power granted
to Congress by Wickard and Raich is inconsistent with the plan and purpose of the
30 1
Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, neither the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and
Proper Clause justify Congressional regulation of the intrastate activities in Wickard and
Raich.

V.
A.

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

As a General Matter,IntrastateActivities and Conduct are not ProperSubjects for
FederalLegislation

Who cares whether Congress regulates intrastate activities? In theory, it would be
possible to argue that states are not important, and that it makes no difference whether
Congress regulates intrastate activities.
There are three reasons why Congress should not, as a general matter, be allowed
to regulate intrastate activities. First, the text of the Constitution provides no general
federal police power. Congress is granted limited and enumerated powers, not plenary
powers. 30 2 The Constitutional Convention considered giving Congress a general federal
or national police power.

The idea was rejected.

303

During the ratification debates,

297. Id. at 588-89.
298. 22 U.S. at 189.
299. Id. at 187.
300. Id.
at 195.
301. Justice O'Connor described the all-encompassing nature of the commerce power in her Raich
dissent, 125 S. Ct. at 2225:
It will not do to say that Congress may regulate noncommercial activity simply because it may have
an effect on the demand for commercial goods, or because the noncommercial endeavor can, in
some sense, substitute for commercial activity. Most commercial goods or services have some sort
of privately producible analogue. Home care substitutes for daycare. Charades games substitute for
movie tickets. Backyard or windowsill gardening substitutes for going to the supermarket. To draw
the line wherever private activity affects the demand for market goods is to draw no line at all, and
to declare everything economic. We have already rejected the result that would follow-a federal
police power.
Justice Thomas made a similar point: "If the majority is to be taken seriously, the Federal Government may
now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 states." 125 S. Ct. at 2236
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
302. Greve, supra n. 19, at 13-14, 17-18.
303. Barnett, supra n. 9, at 155 (discussing proposal by Gunning Bedford).
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opponents of the Constitution-the Anti-Federalists--charged that all discretion
regarding the powers of Congress resided with Congress itself.304 Federalist supporters
30 5
of the Constitution repeatedly denied the charge.
Second, the states are sovereign entities under the American Constitution. The
states are the successors of the autonomous British colonies; they created the United
States by surrendering some but not all of their power to the federal government they
created.30 6 Significantly, the states retained more power than they surrendered. In
Federalist No. 39, James Madison said that the jurisdiction of the proposed federal
government "extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States
a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." 30 7 In Federalist No. 17
Alexander Hamilton explained that "[t]he administration of private justice between the
citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a
for by local
similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided
30 8
legislation, can never be desirable cares of a [national] jurisdiction.,
Third, the states provide protection against tyranny. According to Judge Michael
McConnell, the Framers "believed that state governments were, in some vital respects,
30 9
safer repositories of power over individual liberties than the federal government."
Justice Breyer has made a similar point:
By guaranteeing state and local governments broad decision-making authority, federalist
principles secure decisions that rest on knowledge of local circumstances, help to develop a
sense of shared purposes and commitments among local citizens, and ultimately facilitate
"novel social and economic experiments." Through increased transparency, those
principles make it easier for citizens to hold government officials accountable. And by
bringing government closer to home, they help maintain a sense of local community. In all
Constant
these ways they facilitate and encourage the ancient liberty that [Benjamin]
3 10
described: citizen participation in the government's decision-making process.
'
According to Justice O'Connor, the "federalist structure of joint sovereigns 311
results in and "preserves to the people" 312 numerous benefits and advantages:
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes
3 13
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.

304. Id.
305. Id. at 155-57.
306. Raoul Berger, JudicialManipulationof the Commerce Clause, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 695, 696 (1996).
307. Id.at 696 (emphasis in original).
308. Barnett, supra n. 9, at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted, brackets in original, emphasis added,
footnote omitted). Significantly, both Wickard and Raich involved agriculture-an activity Hamilton identified
as a matter of local concern.
309. Berger, supra n. 306, at 698 (quoting Michael W. McComell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'
Design, 54. U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1506 (1987)) (intemal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
310. Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: InterpretingOur Democratic Constitution 57 (Alfred A. Knopf 2005)
(footnote omitted).
311. Gregoryv. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
312. Id.
313. Id.
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In addition, Justice Brandeis observed that federalism promotes innovation by
allowing for the possibility that "a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country." 3 14 Significantly, states cannot serve as laboratories of innovation
unless they are afforded a sphere of action that is protected from federal encroachment.
B.

Regulation of Intrastate Conduct Cannot be Justified because of Changed
Circumstances

The commerce power was originally intended to be limited and discrete. Now, it
provides the constitutional basis for a national police power-a plenary power to
legislate about virtually anything. Why has the commerce power changed?
In his Morrison dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the commerce power is now a

plenary power because, over time, the nature of commerce has changed.3 15 When the
3 16
market.
Constitution was adopted in 1787, there was no unified, integrated national

There were thirteen separate state markets. After the Civil War, a national market
developed. As a consequence (the argument asserts), all commerce is interstate
3 17

commerce.
Justice Breyer asserts that the Court must accept the fact that the world has
changed, and that changed circumstances have rendered old conceptions of the
commerce power obsolete: "The world is different now, and 'judges cannot change the
3 18
world.'
There are three problems with Justice Breyer's argument that the commerce power
now extends to intrastate activities because the nature of commerce has changed. First,
The argument that all commerce is interstate
all activities are not commercial.
commerce does not imply that all activities are interstate commerce. Wheat and
3 19
marijuana grown for personal use are not commerce.
Second, the basic premise is false. Some commerce is demonstrably not interstate
commerce. While the instrumentalities of interstate commerce (telephones, broadband

314. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Epstein, supra n. 9, at 38-40; White, supra n. 15, at 278-84. Competing state
governments offer citizens a choice with respect to public goods and services. By making a choice among
states, citizens create and define communities and local cultures. This view finds its best expression in the
"Tiebout hypothesis," a theory elaborated by Charles Tiebout in a 1956 paper. "The famous Tiebout
hypothesis states that competition between local governments allows ordinary citizens to sort themselves into
those communities that supply the public amenities that best suit their own particular needs." Epstein, supra
n. 9, at 60 (citing Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Political Econ. 416 (1956)).
In lay terms, this is the phenomenon of "[vloting-with-the-feet." Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice 111 186
(Cambridge U. Press 2003); see id. at ch. 10 (discussing the public choice theory of federalism).
315. 529 U.S. at 656-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
316. See id.
317. Id. at 660 ("We live in a Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, technological, commercial,
and environmental change. Those changes, taken together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter
how local, genuinely can affect commerce, or its conditions, outside the State-at least when considered in the
aggregate.") (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964)); see Fried, supra n. 15,
at 32.
318. Fried, supra n. 15, at 32 (quoting Morrison,529 U.S. at 660).
319. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Cushman, supra n. 189, at 212-22; White,
supra n. 15, at 229-31.
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communications, radio, television) dominate the national economy, they are not the sole
constituents of interstate commerce. David Engdahl has advanced what he calls the
"herpes theory" of interstate commerce. 320 Under this theory, "some lingering federal
power"321-that is, the commerce power-"infects whatever has passed through the
federal dominion." 322 It is necessary to recognize a corollary to the herpes theory: Not
everything is infected. Some people and things do not pass through the channels of
interstate commerce. Some activities do not use the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.
Third, it is not true that "judges cannot change the world." It is the mission of
judges to change the world: Judges resolve disputes. Judges also serve as "republican
schoolmasters" 323 for all citizens. 324 And judges have changed the world. Marbury v.
Madison,3 25 Brown v. Maryland,326 Dred Scott v. Sandford,327 and Roe v. Wade 3 28 all
made and changed human history.
.

C.

Why did Justices Kennedy and Scalia Vote with the Majority?

The result in Raich is surprising because of the changed positions of Justice Scalia
and Justice Kennedy. Scalia and Kennedy voted with the majority in Lopez and
Morrison. The key question is: Why did they change their votes in Raich? There are at
least three possible answers.
First, Raich is a drug case. Commentators have suggested that there is a "drug
exception" to the Constitution.
According to this theory, the normal rules of
constitutional law are suspended in cases involving drug crimes. 329 Scalia and Kennedy
may have been influenced in some subtle way by the desire to affirm and enforce an
3 30
anti-drug law.

320. Barnett, supra n. 9, at 316 (citing David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper Clause as an Intrinsic
Restrainton FederalLawmaking Power,22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 107, 120 (1998)).
321. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
322. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
323. See Ralph A. Rossum, The Supreme Court: Republican Schoolmaster, in Leo Strauss, the Straussians,
and the American Regime 363 (Kenneth L. Deutsch & John A. Murley eds., Rowman & Littlefield 1999).
324. Id.
325. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
326. 25 U.S. 419 (1827).
327. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
328. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
329. See Roger Pilon, Tenants, Students, and Drugs: A Comment on the War on the Rule of Law, in Cato
Supreme CourtReview, 2001-2002, at 227, 227-28 (Cato Inst. 2002) (citing Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism,
47 Viii. L. Rev. 753 (2002)); contra Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Exec. Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("There is no drug exception to the Constitution.").
330. This explanation seems unlikely. Although Raich is a drug case, it is primarily a constitutional case. It
is unlikely that Scalia or Kennedy would be decisively and materially influenced by a personal opinion
regarding drugs. Thomas, O'Connor, and Rehnquist dissented in Raich. That does not mean that they are
pro-drug, or that they endorse the use of medical marijuana.
While arguments are advanced for legalizing drugs, those arguments are not compelling. Theodore
Dalrymple, a doctor who has practiced in a British inner-city hospital and prison, has written:
It might be argued that the freedom to choose among a variety of intoxicating substances is a
much more important freedom and that millions of people have derived innocent fun from taking
stimulants and narcotics. But the consumption of drugs has the effect of reducing men's freedom by
circumscribing the range of their interests. It impairs their ability to pursue more important human
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Second, Raich and Wickard are very similar cases. If Scalia and Kennedy had
joined the Raich dissenters (Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Thomas), it might have been
necessary to overrule Wickard. The practical cost of overturning Wickard may have
been too high. Many significant pieces of legislation are predicated upon the expansive,
"national police power" construction of the Commerce Clause. Overturning Wickard
would create "Constitutional doubt" regarding federal criminal statutes, environmental
protection legislation, and civil rights acts. 33 1 It is possible to imagine a very negative
popular-or Congressional-reaction to cases overturning such statutes. Congress might
not have been willing to
initiate its own "court-packing plan." Kennedy and Scalia may
332
risk the Court's political prestige and institutional legitimacy.
Third, it is possible that Scalia and Kennedy are not as committed to federalism as
Rehnquist, Thomas, and O'Connor. Until very recently, it was generally accepted that
Congress was not really restricted or limited by the Commerce Clause. Scalia and
Kennedy may be more inclined to defer to Congress than to second guess federal
legislation. Kennedy is committed to the principle of stare decisis in Commerce Clause
cases. In his Lopez concurrence, Kennedy indicated his reluctance to overturn the old
cases that endorse a broad commerce power-including Wickard. In Lopez, he wrote:
The history of our Commerce Clause decisions contains at least two lessons of
relevance to this case. The first, as stated at the outset, is the imprecision of content-based
boundaries used without more to define the limits of the Commerce Clause. The second,
related to the first but of even greater consequence, is that the Court as an institution and
the legal system as a whole have an immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause
jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point. Stare decisis operates with great force in
counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting the
congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature. That fundamental
restraint on our power forecloses us from reverting to an understanding of commerce that
would serve only an 18th-century economy, dependent then upon production and trading
practices that had changed but little over the preceding centuries; it also mandates against
returning to the time when congressional authority to regulate undoubted commercial
activities was limited by a judicial determination that those matters had an insufficient
connection to an interstate system. Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the

aims, such as raising a family and fulfilling civic obligations. Very often it impairs their ability to
pursue gainful employment and promotes parasitism. Moreover, far from being expanders of
consciousness, most drugs severely limit it. On of the most striking characteristics of drug-takers is
their intense and tedious self-absorption; and their journeys into inner space are generally forays
into inner vacuums. Drug-taking is a lazy man's way of pursuing happiness and wisdom, and the
shortcut turns out to be the deadest of dead ends. We lose remarkably little by not being permitted
to take drugs.
Theodore Dalrymple, Our Culture, What's Left of It: The Mandarins and the Masses 223-24 (Ivan R. Dee
2005). Dalrymple's argument seems unanswerable.
331. See Chemerinsky, supra n. 15, at 267, 267 nn. 149-150.
332. If the Court were to overturn Wickard, it would also be necessary to overturn other decisions. A
massive, or even a substantial, violation of the principle of stare decisis might make the Court appear to be a
political body. The Justices may have wanted to avoid the appearance of politics and, accordingly, to preserve
institutional integrity and legitimacy. See Bickel, supra n. 2, at 108-09. Kennedy's commitment to stare
decisis is well known. See PlannedParenthoodof S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national
333
economy.

At his confirmation hearings in 1986, Scalia indicated a willingness to defer to the
judgment of Congress regarding the exercise of power under the Commerce Clause. He
stated:
[T]he primary defender of the constitutional balance, the Federal Government versus the
States[, i.e.] the primary institution to strike the right balance is the Congress.

The [C]ourt's struggles to prescribe what is the proper role of the334
Federal Government
vis-A-vis the State have essentially been abandoned for quite a while.

In addition, commentators have remarked upon Scalia's lack of enthusiasm for the
doctrine of federalism.

3 35

In the alternative, Scalia and Kennedy may have joined the majority in Raich in
order to preserve federalism. They may have joined on the condition that criticism of
Lopez and Morrison-the most important cases in the "New Federalism"-be limited.
Significantly, Raich did not reverse or expressly limit Lopez and Morrison.
D.

Judges Should Not Read the Constitution Ironically

It is currently fashionable for intellectuals to read documents ironically. Richard
Rorty, the popular and frequently-cited philosopher, has celebrated a hypothetical

figure-an archtype-he calls the "liberal ironist." 336 Liberals are "people who think

333. 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
334. Sen. Comm. on the Jud., HearingsBefore the Committee on the Judiciaryon the Nomination of Judge
Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates, 99th Cong. 81-82 (Aug. 5-6,
1986).
335. See e.g. Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia and the Conservative Revival 125 (Johns
Hopkins U. Press 1997); Ralph A. Rossum, Federalism,the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment:
The Irony of ConstitutionalDemocracy ix (Lexington Bks. 2001) (noting that Scalia has stated that "the people
of the United States demonstrated that they no longer believed in federalism when they ratified the Seventeenth
Amendment.").
336. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity xv (Cambridge U. Press 1989) [hereinafter Rorty,
Contingency]; see Simon Blackburn, Truth: A Guide 167 (Oxford U. Press 2005) ("[Rorty] is celebrated for
recommending 'liberal irony' as the proper standpoint on life."). Rorty is known primarily as a pragmatist.
See A Companion to Epistemology, supra n. 7, at 449-50; Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 444 (Harv. U.
Press 1995) (describing Rorty as "the best-known living philosopher of pragmatism"); Rorty & Pragmatism:
The Philosopher Responds to His Critics ix (Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., ed., Vanderbilt U. Press 1995)
[hereinafter Rorty & Pragmatism];Robert Justin Lipkin, Pragmatism-TheUnfinished Revolution: Doctrinaire
and Reflective Pragmatism in Rorty's Social Thought, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1561, 1563 (1993) ("More than any
other single writer, Richard Rorty is responsible for the pragmatic revolution in legal theory.") (citing Daniel J.
Morrissey, Pragmatism and the Politics of Meaning, 43 Drake L. Rev. 615 (1995)). Rorty has been criticized
for being too much of a pragmatist-too willing to discard traditional philosophical notions and distinctions
(for example, the notion of an objective difference between right and wrong). Professor Susan Haack has
described Rorty's philosophy as "vulgar pragmatism."
Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards
Reconstruction in Epistemology ch. 9 (Blackwell 1995). Haack criticizes Rorty on the grounds that his work is
cynical and relativistic. Id. at 192. Rorty responds to Haack in Rorty & Pragmatism. Rorty & Pragmatism,
supra, at 148-53.
Rorty rejects philosophical efforts to find ultimate truths, fundamental values, and permanent things.
For Rorty, "there exists no absolute truth, no privileged text, no God's-eye point of view." Joan C. Williams,
Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 131, 131-32 (1992) (footnote
omitted). He thinks that we believe things, not because they are true, but rather "because the belief fits our
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that cruelty is the worst thing we do." 33 7 Ironists are people "who [face] up to the
contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desires[, people who are]
sufficiently historicist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those central
3 38
In
beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance."
other words, ironists are people who are not certain of their fundamental beliefs. As a
ironists are people who are "never quite able to take themselves
consequence,
3 39
seriously."

other beliefs." Posner, supra, at 448. For this reason, Rorty is philosophically unable to condemn Hitler.
"I have always (well, not always, but for the last twenty years or so) been puzzled about what was supposed to
count as a knockdown answer to Hitler." Id. at 448 n. 8 (quoting Richard Rorty, Truth and Freedom: A Reply
to Thomas McCarthy, 16 Critical Inquiry 633, 636 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
at 74. From this insight it follows that:
337. Rorty, Contingency, supran. 336, at xv; see id.
,morality' should not be taken to denote anything other than our abilities to notice, identify with,
and alleviate pain and humiliation. Someone who is committed to the vocabulary of liberalism
thinks that there is no noncirculartheoreticaljustification for his belief that cruelty is a horrible
thing. He thinks and talks from within the midst of certain historically and culturally local
practices. He does not take the validity of those practices to rest on an ahistorical or transcultural
foundation. He takes his commitment to liberalism to be nothing more than a function of his
commitment to community.
James Conant, Freedom, Cruelty, and Truth: Rorty versus Orwell, in Rorty and His Critics 276, 277 (Robert B.
Brandom ed., Blackwell Publg. 2000) (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted); see Rorty, Contingency, supra
n. 336, at xv, 189, 193, 195.
at 73. Daniel J.Morrissey describes the role of irony in
338. Rorty, Contingency,supra n. 336, at xv; see id.
Rorty's thought as follows:
Rorty's salvation from nihilism.., is the notion that our society's commitment to personal freedom
will allow each of us to become, in his words, "strong poets"-shapers of our own "imaginative
identifications." Irony is the human skill that can make it possible for us to realize that goal. Irony,
for Rorty, is the ability to redescribe our contingent situations .... [I]rony empowers each of us to
verbally recreate ourselves and our worlds.
Morrissey, supra n. 336, at 639 (footnotes omitted); see Rorty, Contingency, supra n. 336, at 73-93. Rorty
takes the term "strong poet" from Harold Bloom, the Yale University literary critic. Rorty, Contingency, supra
n. 336, at 53. For Harold Bloom, strong poets are "major figures with the persistence to wrestle with their
strong precursors, even to the death." Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry 5 (2d ed.,
Oxford U. Press 1997). "Poets, by the time they have grown strong, do not read the poetry of X, for really
strong poets can read only themselves." Id. at 19.
Morrissey continues:
Rorty pays great debt to Freud who, he says, democratized that art [i.e., irony] by legitimizing the
idiosyncratic fantasy life of each person. All of us then can find our ultimate satisfaction by gaining
this semantic control over our lives. We can't make contact with something larger or more enduring
than ourselves. If we become adept at irony, we can put our unique stamp on life and, like
Nietzsche, be able to say at the end of our days "thus I willed it."
Morrissey, supra n. 336, at639 (footnotes omitted).
339. Rorty, Contingency, supran. 336, at 73; see Blackburn, supra n. 336, at 167. Rortian ironists know that
the "vocabularies" they use to describe their fundamental beliefs are "always on the verge of obsolescence."
Blackburn, supra n. 336, at 167. According to Haack, the "skilful insinuation" is that "non-ironists are
humorless prigs." Haack, supra n. 336, at 193 (citing Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others 86
(Cambridge U. Press 1991) [hereinafter Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others]) (footnote omitted). In fact,
Rorty has described philosophers who think of themselves as seeking the truth as "lovably old-fashioned
prigs." Susan Haack, Manifesto of a PassionateModerate: Unfashionable Essays 7 (U. Chi. Press 1998)
(citing Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, supra, at 86) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)
[hereinafter Haack, Manifesto]. When Rorty's most influential work, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, was
reviewed in the HarvardLaw Review, the reviewer observed that "Rorty's constant reminder to indulge 'the
spirit of playfulness' suggests an implicit reliance on an unbearable lightness of being." Allan C. Hutchinson,
The Three 'Rs': Reading/Rorty/Radically, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 555, 568 (1989).
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Rorty explained the approach of the liberal ironist by comparing her to a stuffy,
34
priggish unenlightened foil, a figure Rorty calls "the metaphysician": 0
The typical strategy of the metaphysician is to spot an apparent contradiction between
two platitudes, two intuitively plausible propositions, and then propose a distinction which
will resolve the contradiction. Metaphysicians then go on to embed this distinction within
a network of associated distinctions - a philosophical theory - which will take some of the
strain off the initial distinction. This sort of theory construction is the same method used
by judges to decide hard cases, and by theologians to interpret hard texts. That activity is
the metaphysician's paradigm of rationality.
He sees philosophical theories as
converging - a series of discoveries about the nature of such things as truth and
personhood, which get closer and closer to the way they
really are, and carry the culture as
34 1
a whole closer to an accurate representation of reality.
The ironist, in contrast to the metaphysician, analyzes philosophical theories in
terms of ever-changing "vocabularies":
The ironist ...views the sequence of such theories - such interlocked patterns of
novel distinctions - as gradual, tacit substitutions of a new vocabulary for an old one. She
calls "platitudes" what the metaphysician calls "intuitions." She is inclined to say that
when we surrender an old platitude (e.g., "The number of biological species is fixed" or
"Human beings differ from animals because they have sparks of the divine with them" or
"Blacks have no rights which whites are bound to respect"), we have made a change rather
than discovered a fact. The ironist, observing the sequence of "great philosophers" and the
interaction between their thought and its social setting, sees a series of changes in the
linguistic and other practices of the Europeans. Whereas the metaphysician sees the
modem Europeans as particularly good at discovering how things really are, the ironist
342
sees them as particularly rapid in changing their self-image, in re-creating themselves.
Metaphysicians argue the truth or validity of logical "propositions." 343 They make
34 5
344
Ironists, in contrast, argue by redefining or redescribing terms.
or draw inferences.
346
Ironists invent new terms and use "old words in new senses":

340. Rorty, Contingency,supra n. 336, at 77.
341. Id.The metaphysician's method has been analogized to the method a common law judge uses to decide
a case. See Hutchinson, supra n. 339, at 577.
342. Rorty, Contingency, supra n. 336, at 77-78. Rorty's description of what a liberal ironist actually
does-substituting a new vocabulary for an old one-is vague. Susan Haack provides the following
illustration:
SHE: For the last time, do you love me or don't you?
HE:
I DON'T!
SHE: Quit stalling, I want a direct answer.
Jane Russell and Fred Astaire, 'carrying on the conversation'
Haack, supra n. 336, at 182 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). Haack gives credit to iconoclastic
Australian philosopher David Stove for "reporting this dialogue." Id.at 232 n. 1.
In Haack's example, "HE" (i.e., Fred Astaire) is a metaphysician. HE uses the same old vocabulary to
answer questions. "SHE" (i.e., Jane Russell) is a liberal ironist. SHE invents a new vocabulary in which
Fred's words (i.e., "I DON'T") are somehow ambiguous-or, at any rate, something other than a direct answer.
The point is clear: "[A]nything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed." John Patrick Diggins,
The Promise of Pragmatism:Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority 470 (U. Chi. Press 1994)
(discussing Rorty) (intemal quotation marks omitted).
343. Rorty, Contingency,supra n. 336, at77.
344. Id.
345. Id.
at 78.
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The metaphysician thinks that there is an overriding intellectual duty to present
arguments for one's controversial views - arguments which will start from relatively
uncontroversial premises. The ironist thinks that such arguments - logical arguments - are
all very well in their way, and useful as expository devices, but in the end not much more
than ways of getting people to change their practices without admitting they have done so.
The ironist's preferred form of argument is dialectical in the sense that she takes the unit of
persuasion to be a vocabulary rather than a proposition. Her method is redescription rather
than inference. lronists specialize in redescribing ranges of objects or events in partially
neologistic jargon, in the hope of inciting people to adopt and extend that jargon. An
ironist hopes that by the time she has finished using old words in new senses, not to
mention introducing
brand-new words, people will no longer ask questions phrasedin the
34 7
old words.
Justice Jackson unconsciously played the role of a "liberal ironist" when he wrote
the Wickard opinion. He abandoned the old vocabulary of the Commerce Clause--"dual
sovereignty," "direct effect," and the distinction between "commerce" and
"manufacturing" and "agriculture." Jackson substituted a new vocabulary: He equated
"commerce" with "economics," but allowed noncommercial and noneconomic conduct
to be regulated under the Commerce Clause (the "Common Paradox"). He defined
"interstate" to include "intrastate" (the "Interstate Paradox"). He justified the regulation
of intrastate commerce when the regulated conduct had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, but equated "trivial" with "substantial" (the "Substantial Paradox.")
By following and reaffirming Wickard, the Raich Court also acted as liberal
ironists. Interestingly, the Raich Court could claim that it was simply following
well-established precedent (i.e., Wickard).
There is a major methodological problem.
Irony-whether intentional or
34 8
unintentional-is the opposite of common sense.
Constitutional interpretation should

346. Id.
347. Id. (emphasis added). In a way, the "substitutions of a new vocabulary" by a liberal ironist resembles a
"paradigm shift" in natural science-the replacement of an old theoretical model of the world by a new one
(e.g., the replacement of the geocentric world view by a heliocentric world view, the replacement of Newtonian
physics by relativistic physics/quantum mechanics). The idea of "paradigm shifts" is associated with Thomas
S. Kuhn. See A Companion to Epistemology, supra n. 7, at 295. As previously noted, Professor Barry
Cushman has observed that the New Deal Justices-the Roosevelt appointees-were able to break free of the
"older constitutional vocabulary" of the Nine Old Men. See Cushman, supra n. 189, at 224; see also supra
nn. 202-237 and accompanying text.
348. Rorty, Contingency, supra n. 336, at 74 ("The opposite of irony is common sense."). Conant has
paraphrased Rorty as follows:
Ironism is opposed to common sense. To be commonsensical is to take for granted that statements
formulated in one's current vocabulary - the vocabulary to one which one has become
habituated- suffice to describe and judge the beliefs, actions and lives of those who employ
alternative vocabularies. An ironist is someone who thinks there is no single preferred vocabulary.
No vocabulary is closer or more transparent to reality than any other. An ironist realizes that
anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed in an alternative vocabulary. She
renounces the attempt to formulate neutral criteria of choice between vocabularies. While
provisionally continuing to employ her present vocabulary, she nourishes radical and abiding doubts
concerning it, and has no truck with arguments phrased in it which seek either to underwrite or to
dissolve these doubts. She cherishes works of literature as precious cognitive resources because
they initiate her into new vocabularies,furnishing her with novel means - not for seeing reality as it
is, but rather - for playing off descriptionsagainst redescriptions.
Conant, supra n. 337, at 277 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
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be common sense interpretation. As Justice Joseph Story put it: "[T]he Constitution is to
34 9
be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense."
Chief Justice Marshall also emphasized the need to interpret Constitutional
language in its common, or natural, sense. In Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall said:
As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most
directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who
framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have
3 50
employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they said.

Laurence Tribe's comment on the quoted language from Gibbons is interesting
and, for the most part, apt: "John Marshall argued in Gibbons v. Ogden that there is good
35 1
reason, whenever possible, to resist reading the Constitution as a gnostic text."
Justices of the Supreme Court, like lawyers and other federal officials, take an oath
to support the Constitution of the United States. 352 As a result of that oath, the Justices
have a duty of fidelity to the Constitution. When Justices read the Constitution
3 53
ironically, they violate their oath.

349. Leo Strauss, the Straussians, and the American Regime, supra n. 323 (quoting Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States vol. 1, 436-37 (Hilliard Gray & Co. 1833)) (internal
quotation marks omitted, bracket in original, footnote omitted). According to Justice Story,
Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for
critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness, or
judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature, founded on the common business of
human life, adopted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common
understandings. The people make them, the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to
read them, with the help of common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite
meaning or any extraordinary gloss.
Id. at 366-67 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
Late in life James Madison-the Father of the Constitution-wrote a letter suggesting that "the public"
was the "surest expositor of the Constitution."
Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and JudicialReview 146 (Oxford U. Press 2004). This leads some modem commentators to
propose that the plain and natural meaning of the text should govern. See id at 233-48.
350. Tribe, supra n. 6, at 61 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 188) (internal quotation marks and footnote
omitted).
351. Id. Interestingly, Scalia has suggested that secret, hidden meanings can play a role in adjudication. In a
law review article, Scalia observed that "I never thought Oliver Wendell Holmes and the legal realists did us a
favor by pointing out that all these legal fictions were fictions: Those judges wise enough to be trusted with the
secret already knew it." Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking Certainty: The Misguided
Quest for Constitutional Foundations 38 (U. Chi. Press 2002) (quoting Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of
Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 581, 589 (1989-90)) (internal quotation marks and
footnote omitted). It is not clear whether Scalia was being serious. Professors Farber and Sherry suggest that
Scalia's statement "has an intriguing resonance with conservative philosopher Leo Strauss's views that texts by
the wise conceal their true views." Id. at 178 n. 29; see Leo Strauss, Persecutionand the Art of Writing ch. 2
(U. Chi. Press 1952); Richard A. Posner, What Has Modern Literary Theory to Offer Law? 53 Stan. L.
Rev. 195, 203 (2000); see also George P. Fletcher, Our Secret Constitution:How Lincoln Redefined American
Democracy 2, 2-10 (Oxford U. Press 2001) (suggesting that the Reconstruction Amendments instituted a
regime change and that "[lt]he principles of this new legal regime are so radically different from our original
Constitution, drafted in 1787, that they deserve to be recognized as a second American constitution").
352. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3.
353. See e.g. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 180; Nowak & Rotunda, supra n. 15, at § 1.3; but see Bickel, supra n. 2,
at 7-8. When Justices read the Constitution ironically they substitute a new vocabulary for the actual words in
the text of the Constitution. In other words, they divest the text of its common sense meaning. They reject
stability and historical continuity, and embrace "change." George Will makes the point as follows:
When we require legislators and Presidents to swear allegiance to the Constitution, are we really
asking only that they pledge allegiance to a system of "change"? Americans have generally
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The Commerce Clause paradoxes are not defensible: "Interstate" does not mean
"intrastate." "Commerce" does not mean "noncommercial activity" (e.g., growing wheat
or marijuana for home use). "Substantial" does not mean "trivial" (e.g., the amount of
wheat grown by farmer Filburn or the amount of marijuana cultivated and used by Raich
and Monson). When words in the Constitution are "redefined" to mean their oppositestheir antonyms-there is no fidelity to the Constitution. Defining a word to mean its
antonym is not a legitimate practice under any theory of interpretation. The Wickard
Justices violated their oath. The Raich Court should not have followed Wickard.
Some lawyers and constitutional theorists may object to the argument for fidelity
to the text of the Constitution on the ground that it is a species of "originalism." It is
generally acknowledged that originalism is dead as a theory of constitutional
interpretation. 354 It is not "interpretation," however, to read a word to mean its
linguistic/semantic opposite (e.g., to read "black" to mean "white"). There has to be a
practical or pragmatic limit to interpretation. Imagine a spectrum or continuum of
constitutional interpretation with (1) judicial interpretation of simple concrete terms as
one end point (e.g., "No person.., shall be eligible to the Office of President... who
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years." 355) and (2) formal amendment as
the other end point (e.g., "The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby repealed."356). At some point, "interpretation" would become
"amendment." This limit might be called the Orwellian Limit, in honor of "Newspeak,"
357
the language George Orwell invented for his novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four.
Alternatively, the limit of permissible constitutional interpretation might be called the
"Orwell-Schwarzenegger Limit." Surely everyone would agree that the Constitution

assumed that "change" means "growth," which implies health. But even if... that equation is
accepted, it does not settle this question: What does Constitution constitute? It constitutes a polity,
a nation, which is more than an institutional arrangement for perpetual openness or "change." It
would be quixotic and imprudent for a community to attempt to freeze its customs, habits and
dispositions. But it would be imprudent and probably fatal to a community to deny the community
any right to attempt to perpetuate itself in recognizable form.
Will, supra n. 9, at 78-79.
The case for historical continuity was made, famously and eloquently, by Justice Holmes. In a speech
on June 25, 1895, at a dinner of the Harvard Law School Association in honor of Professor C. C. Langdell,
Holmes said:
The law, so far as it depends on learning, is indeed, as it has been called, the government of the
living by the dead. To a very considerable extent no doubt it is inevitable that the living should be
so governed. The past gives us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagination; we cannot
get away from it. There is, too, a peculiar logical pleasure in making manifest the continuity
between what we are doing and what has been done before. But the present has a right to govern
itself so far as it can; and it ought always to be remembered that historic continuity with the past is
not a duty, it is only a necessity.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Speech, Speech at a Dinner of the HarvardLaw School Association in Honor of
Professor C. C. Langdell (Harv. L. Sch. Assn., June 25, 1895), in The Essential Holmes: Selections from
Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 184 (Richard A.
Posner, ed., U. Chi. Press 1992); see Diggins, supra n. 342, at 354.
354. See e.g. Farber & Sherry, supra n. 351, at 10-28; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985).
355. U.S. Const. art. 11,§ 1.
356. U.S. Const. amend. 21, § 1.
357. See Orwell, supra n. 231.
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would have to be amended (by means of the formal article V process) in order to allow
Arnold Schwarzenegger to become president of the United States. Schwarzenegger was
born in Austria and is a naturalized citizen. Only persons who are "natural born
Citizen[s] ' 35 8 of the United States can become President. 35 9 The thesis of this article is
that the Raich and Wickard Courts exceeded the Orwell-Schwarzenegger Limit-that
360
they impermissibly and unconstitutionally "amended" the Commerce Clause.
The Wickard Justices were not the first Justices to violate their oath by interpreting
the Constitution ironically. In Plessy v. Ferguson,36 1 the Court endorsed the doctrine of

"separate but equal"-a form of apartheid. 362 "Equal" means, among other things, "the
same." "Separate" means "different." Separate facilities-that is, different facilitiescannot be "the same." "Different" is the antonym of the "same." The Court was playing
363

language games in Plessy.

Two important qualifications must be made. First, this article condemns the
practice of constitutional irony-the paradoxical redefinition of constitutional terms to
mean their opposites. It does not condemn all forms of constitutional agnosticism or

constitutional skepticism. The Constitution is itself agnostic (or, at least, pluralistic). It
provides a platform within which citizens can use their liberty to achieve their destinies.
The Constitution does not endorse a specific philosophy, political agenda, or economic
364
theory.

Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist quoted the following language, from Holmes's
Lochner dissent, with approval:
[The] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissezfaire. It is made
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain
opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our

358. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
359. Id.
360. See Barnett, supran. 9, at ch. 4 (discussing interpretation and the requirement of written amendments to
the Constitution); id.
at 312-15 (discussing the Commerce Clause); id. at 350-53 (discussing amendments).
361. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
362. Id.at 551-52.
363. As a matter of semantics, the constitutional irony in Plessy is arguably more subtle than the irony in
Wickard and Raich. But, it is hard to say that there was anything subtle about Plessy.
364. George Carey, Who or What Killed the Philadelphia Constitution? 36 Tulsa L.J. 621, 636 (2001);
William H. Rehnquist, Observation: The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693, 703 (1976).
Will rejects Holmes's famous statement that a Constitution "is made for people of fundamentally differing
views." Will, supra n. 9, at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Will,
The Constitution does not just distribute powers, it does so in a cultural context of principles and
beliefs and expectations about the appropriate social outcome of the exercise of those powers. Only
a few of those are even intimated in the text of the Constitution. That is why, considered apart from
the cultural context, the Constitution is impossible to explicate. Holmes 'sfamous statement that a
constitution "is madefor people offundamentally differing views " is radicallyfalse. A constitution
not only presupposes a consensus of "views" on fundamentals; it also presupposes concern for its
own continuance. Therefore, it presupposes efforts to predispose rising generations to the "views"
and habits and dispositions that underlie institutional arrangements. In this sense, a constitution is
not only an allocator of powers: it is also the polity's frame of mind.
Id. (emphasis added, footnote omitted); see also id at 79-80.
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statutes embodying them conflict with the
judgment upon the question whether
36 5
Constitution of the United States.
Some of the most distinguished federal judges have been skeptics. Learned Hand,
for example, was fascinated by a saying of Oliver Cromwell: "I beseech ye in the bowels
of Christ, think that ye may be mistaken." 366 Hand wanted Cromwell's paean to
skepticism to be "written 'over the portals of every church, every courthouse and at
every crossroads in the nation."' 367 Hand held the remarkable view that the spirit of
liberty is essentially the spirit that "is not too sure that it is right." 3 68 Hand believed that
people should "doubt a little of [their] own infallibility." 369 Handian skepticism seems
3 70
positive and appropriate.
Hand's skepticism may echo and reverberate the skepticism of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes. Holmes-the "Great Overlord of the Law"--wrote that "time has
upset many fighting faiths,, 37 1 and that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." 372 In his essay on natural law,
Holmes wrote that:
Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of many things that were not
so.... One cannot be wrenched from the rocky crevices into which one is thrown for
many years without feeling that one is attacked in one's life. What we most love and
revere generally is determined by early associations. I love granite rocks and barberry
bushes, no doubt because with them were my earliest joys that reach back through the past
eternity of my life. But while one's experience thus makes certain preferences dogmatic
for oneself, recognition of how they came to be so leaves one able to see that others, poor

365. Rehnquist, supra n. 364, at 703 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
366. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand xxiv (Irving Dilliard
ed., 3d ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).
367. Id. at xxv; see Hayek, supran. 107, at 530 n. 12.
368. Hand, supra n. 366, at 190.
369. Farber & Sherry, supra n. 351, at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted, bracket in original, footnote
omitted).
370. One of Hand's law clerks, Ronald Dworkin, described Hand's attitude this way:
Hand's skepticism consisted not in the philosophical view that no moral conviction can be
objectively true, but in a disabling uncertainty that he-or anyone else-could discover which
convictions were true: he thought moral matters were much too subtle and complex to allow anyone
much confidence in his own opinions. He often said that he despised "absolutes." He meant, by
that ambiguous phrase, that he distrusted any attempt to resolve the untidy complexity of a moral or
legal or political issue in a neat and simple formula.... [H]e had come to the remarkable view that
the spirit of liberty is essentially the spirit "that is not too sure that it is right," and ... he
recommended, as a "combination of tolerance and imagination that to me is the epitome of all good
government," Benjamin Franklin's plea that people should on occasion "doubt a little of [their] own
infallibility."
Id. at 124, 124 n. 8 (ellipses and brackets in original, footnote omitted).
Interestingly, Hand's view that the spirit of liberty is the spirit "that is not too sure that it is right" seems
completely inconsistent with the Court's famous proclamation that "[Iliberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence
of doubt." Casey, 505 U.S. at 844; see Farber & Sherry, supra n. 351, at 124 (making the same comparison).
371. White, supra n. 15, at 136 (quoting Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). Cardozo called Holmes "the great overlord of the law and its
philosophy." John T. Noonan, Jr., Persons and Masks of the Law: Cardozo, Holmes, Jefferson, and Wythe as
Makers of the Masks 66 (U. Cal. Press 1976) (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 Harv. L.
Rev. 682, 691 (1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
372. White, supra n. 15, at 136 (quoting Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630) (internal quotation marks and footnote
omitted).
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And this again means

Holmes's skepticism, however, was not benign.
It was a thoroughgoing moral
skepticism, a near nihilist position born of Holmes's horrible experiences in the Civil
War:
With the smell of war in his nostrils, Holmes concluded that every cause-the
abolition of human slavery included-was a personal taste of no notable significance. The
postwar Holmes ranked the prewar Holmes with the Trotskyites, the pacifists, and the
Christian Scientists. He evidently thought himself a fool to have believed in a cause
beyond himself Experiencing the death of comrades, the flow of senseless orders, the
sight of lifeless bodies piled deep in the trenches, the rush of blood from his mouth, a bullet
in the neck, a bullet in the chest, and a bullet in the ankle, Holmes concluded that right
374
could never be more than the will of the strongest--"what a given crowd will fight for."
Holmes's three serious wounds and other Civil War experiences did not simply destroy
3 75
his beliefs. The war "made him lose his belief in beliefs.
Holmes's extreme skepticism has been condemned by thoughtful critics as
"adolescent." 3 76
A contemporary admirer of Holmes-Judge Richard Posneradvocates a more moderate skepticism: (1) Posner emphasizes the "test of time," 37 7 the
positive and creative part of Holmes's skepticism; 378 (2) Posner emphasizes candormaking one's skepticism public; 3 79 and (3) Posner makes the vital point that a moderate
3 80
judicial skepticism can promote two important judicial virtues---caution and humility.
According to Posner,
[j]urisprudence itself is much too solemn and self-important. Its votaries write too
marmoreal, hieratic and censorious a prose.... [L]aw needs more of the scientific spirit

373. Rehnquist, supra n. 364, at 704-05 (quoting Natural Law, in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal

Papers 310, 311 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1921)) (internal quotation marks omitted, ellipses in original, footnote
omitted).

374. Albert W. Alschuler, Law Without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes 185 (U. Chi.

Press 2000).
375. Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club 4 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2001).
376. E.g. Alschuler, supran. 374, at 194 (noting that Holmes's views of moral issues "were more adolescent
than profound" (footnote omitted)); Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 48-49 (Yale U. Press 1977);
Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 Stan. L. Rev. 254 (1963); Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice
Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1962); see also Leuchtenburg, supra n. 189, at 3-29, 14
(criticizing Holmes for imposing his personal views of eugenics by judicial fiat: "Three generations of
imbeciles are enough"); Sheldon M. Novick, Honorable Justice: The Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes xvii
(Little, Brown & Co. 1989) ("Justice Holmes proved to be a shadowed figure, marked by the bigotry and
sexism of his age, who in personal letters seemed to espouse a kind of fascist ideology. He was a violent,
combative, womanizing aristocrat."). Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, Rorty admires Holmes's
poetic style and praises his Lochner dissent. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope 99 (Penguin
Bks. 1999).
377. Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence112 (Harv. U. Press 1990).
378. Id. at 112-13, 453 ("Today we are all skeptics.").
379. ld. at 453.
380. Id. at 452-53; see Bickel, supra n. 286, at 3-5 (describing "[t]wo diverging traditions in the mainstream
of Western political thought"--a "liberal contractarian" tradition and a "conservative Whig" tradition).
"Without carrying matters to a logical extreme, indeed without pretense to intellectual valor, and without
sanguine spirit, the Whig model rests on a mature skepticism." Bickel, supra n. 286, at 4.
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than it has-the spirit of inquiry,
challenge, fallibalism, open-mindedness, respect for fact
38 1
and acceptance of change.
In summary, a condemnation of constitutional irony is not the same as a condemnation of
constitutional skepticism, especially if the judge's skepticism is discussed and disclosed
in a way that is open and obvious.
Second, it is theoretically possible that a judge or Justice may, in an extraordinary
situation, reject a "common sense" or "plain language" interpretation of the Constitution.
That theoretical possibility is considered by Professor Randy Barnett in Restoring the
Lost Constitution.382 If it is necessary to reject a "common sense" reading of the
Constitution, Professor Barnett suggests that the judge or Justice must expressly
acknowledge that he or she is departing fundamentally from the text:
Before the Constitution can be rejected, however, two things must occur. First, one
must determine what its words mean to see if they come up short. These words were put in
writing so they would remain the same until properly changed in writing. Therefore the
meaning to be evaluated is that which was established at the time of enactment or
amendment. Ascertaining the original meaning of the text is, then, a prerequisite for
rejecting it as inadequate.
Second, it must be shown and admitted that the written Constitution has failed because
its substance is inadequate to provide the assurances that legitimacy requires and, therefore,
we are not governing by its terms any longer. In its place will be a provision that a court
finds superior to that contained in the text. Any actor who tries to substitute another
provision from that contained in the Constitution without rejecting the text is trying to have
383
his cake and eat it too.
When would a judge be justified in rejecting the letter of the Constitution? One
example comes to mind: A court considering a case involving the pro-slavery provisions
of the Constitution, prior to the enactment of the Civil War Amendments, would have
been justified in using Bamett's method. The pro-slavery provisions of the Constitution
3 84
were, of course, illegitimate.
VI.
A.

CONCLUSION

Raich and Federalism

Raich is not a good decision. Raich obscures and trivializes fundamental truths:
The Commerce Clause was intended to eliminate internal barriers to trade. It enabled the

381. Posner, supra n. 377, at 465; see also Epstein, supra n. 180, at 263 ("Wrongly understood, skepticism

undermines freedom. Rightly understood, skepticism and freedom form an indissoluble pair."); Farber &
Sherry, supra n. 351, at 39-41 (discussing Scalia's skepticism).
382. Barnett, supra n. 9.

383. Id. at I11.
384. Id. at 109-13, 111 n. 62. "You don't have to remain faithful to evil law just because it is law, even if
you're a judge." David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-Seven Variations on a Theme by Holmes), 48
Stan. L. Rev. 1001, 1030, 1030 n. 213 (1996) (citing H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and
Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 615-21 (1958)) (noting German judges not obligated to obey Nazi laws); see

also Bickel, supra n. 286, at 99-123. Exercises of "judicial civil disobedience" should be the rare exception,
not the rule.
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take-off and growth of the American economy by creating a massive free trade zone and
common market. The Commerce Clause was not intended to grant Congress a national
police power, or to authorize the regulation of trivial, noncommercial intrastate conduct.
In sum, Raich misapprehends the purpose of the Commerce Clause and stretches the
clause beyond its intended scope. The means used to reach that doctrinal end (stretching
the Commerce Clause) are the Interstate Paradox, the Commerce Paradox, and the
Substantial Paradox. Raich distorts the meaning of the Commerce Clause by reading the
Constitution ironically.
Significantly, Raich leaves Congress completely free to
determine the limits of the commerce power. Raich, like Wickard, gives Congress a
blank check. If Raich remains the law, there will be no meaningful judicial review of
many, perhaps most, federal statutes.
Some commentators say Raich signals and symbolizes the end of the "New
Federalism," the beating heart of the Rehnquist legacy. Raich did not kill federalism. If
Wickard was not the death of federalism, Raich will not be the death of federalism. To
be sure, Raich limits and undermines the "New Federalism" of Lopez and Morrison.
385
Significantly, Raich does not overrule Lopez or Morrison. Federalism will rise again.
B.

ConstitutionalIrony

The Wickard and Raich Courts are Constitutional Ironists, the judicial equivalents
of Rorty's Liberal Ironists and Harold Bloom's Strong Poets. They practice a Rortian
jurisprudence of "redescription," substituting new vocabularies for old. They reject the
plain and obvious meaning of "commerce" because that meaning is contingenthistorically conditioned and obsolete-and because it limits and restricts the power of
the federal government. They may think that they are only playing with words. Like
Bloom's "strong poets" they may think that they are not bound by old texts-by the
works of their predecessors: "Poets, by the time they have grown strong, do not read the
poetry of X, for the really strong poets can read only themselves. For them, to be
386
judicious is weak, and to compare, exactly and fairly, is to be not elect."
Writing about Rorty, John Patrick Diggins has explained the dangers of playing
with words:
[T]he spectacle of power and evil may not be contingent and instead defy the philosopher
[or the judge] who assumes that reality, known only as interpreted, can be reinterpreted to
suit political purposes.
Experimenting with vocabularies can do little to change
determinate phenomena that exist independently of language.... [L]anguage fixation is
the focus of the thinker who refused to acknowledge that the wicked inventiveness of
387
power eludes its passing representations.

385. In Garcia, Justice Rehnquist wrote "a brief but painful dissent," Oxford Companion, supra n. 15,
at 378, expressing confidence that the Tenth Amendment federalism of Usery "will ...in time again command
the support of a majority of this Court." Garcia,469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
began her dissent by writing "The Court today surveys the battle scene of federalism and sounds a retreat." Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting, with whom Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., join). She ended by commenting "I share
Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsibility." Id. at 589.
386. Bloom, supra n. 338, at 19; see also supra n. 338 and accompanying text.
387. Diggins, supra n. 342, at 481-82.
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By playing with language, Constitutional Ironists look only to what Edmund Burke
388
called "the shell and husk of history":
You might change the names. The things in some shape remain the same. A certain
quantum of power must always exist in the community, in some hands, and under some
appellation. Wise men will apply their remedies to vices, not to names: to the causes of
evil which are permanent, not to the occasional organs by which they act, and the transitory
modes in which they appear. Otherwise you will be wise historically, a fool in practice.
Seldom have two ages the same fashion in their pretexts and same modes of mischief.
Wickedness is a little more inventive. Whilst you are discussing fashion, the fashion is
gone by. The very same vice assumes a new body. The spirit transmigrates; and, far from
losing its principle of life by the change of its appearance, it is renovated in its new organs
with the fresh vigour of a juvenile activity. It walks abroad; it continues its ravages; whilst
you are gibbeting the carcass, or demolishing the tomb. You are terrifying yourself with
ghosts and apparitions, while your house is the haunt of robbers. It is thus with all those,
who attending only to the shell and husk of history, think they are waging war with
intolerance, pride, and cruelty, whilst, under the colour of abhorring the ill principles of
antiquated parties, they are authorizing
and feeding the same odious vice in different
38 9
factions, and perhaps in worse.
The Constitution is not merely an old literary text, the work of some long-dead
"weak" poet, to be "reinterpreted" and "redescribed" ironically. The Constitution is

solid, hard-edged reality: It is the supreme law of the land. It exists to prevent tyranny
and the abuse of power. 390 For lawyers and judges fidelity to the Constitution is not
merely a duty, it is a necessity. Fidelity to the Constitution means upholding and
following the Constitution, and giving the words of the Constitution their plain,
common-sense meaning. Reading the Constitution ironically, and giving novel and
paradoxical meanings to old words, is not upholding or following the Constitution.
Constitutional irony-ignoring the limits and meaning of the text of the Constitution-is
itself a subtle form of philosophical and poetic tyranny, an intellectual abuse of
39 1
power.

388. Id. at 482 (quoting Burke, supra n. 286, at 120).
389. Diggins, supra n. 342, at 482 (quoting Burke, supra n. 286, at 119-20) (internal quotation marks and
footnote omitted, second emphasis added). This passage by Burke is also quoted in O'Brien's, The Great
Melody, supra n. 285, at 604.
390. See Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The FederalistPapers, supra n. 95. "The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." James
Madison, FederalistNo. 47, in Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The FederalistPapers,supran. 95, at 297, 298.
George Will's observation is particularly apt: "By construing the Constitution in a way that enables the
federal government to act everywhere, we have taught Americans to think it is natural and right for the federal
government to take custody of every problem, to organize the provision of every need, to satisfy every want."
George F. Will, The Leveling Wind: Politics, the Culture and Other News 78 (Penguin Bks. 1994). The result
is a government that "becomes a bland Leviathan, a soft, kindly meant but ultimately corrupting statism, a
statism of benighted benevolence." Id.
391. Constitutional irony-like Rorty's philosophical irony and Bloom's literary irony-is an intellectual
abuse of power because it denigrates and belittles the notion of truth. Rorty explains his notion of truth as
follows:
It is central to the idea of a liberal society that, in respect to words as opposed to deeds, persuasion
as opposed to force, anything goes. This openmindedness should not be fostered because, as
Scripture teaches, Truth is great and will prevail, nor because, as Milton suggests, Truth will always
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From time to time, it is necessary for the citizens of a republic to fight and die to
protect that republic. It has generally been deemed reasonable to ask American citizens
to fight and die to protect the Constitution. This begs the question: Is it reasonable to ask
American citizens to fight and die to protect a Constitution that has been stripped of
meaning by Constitutional Ironists?

win in a free and open encounter. It should be fostered for its own sake. A liberal society is one
which is content to call "true" whatever the upshot of such encounters turns out to he.
Rorty, Contingency,supra n. 336, at 51-52 (emphasis in original).
Susan Haack rejects and criticizes Rorty's notion truth:
"True" is a word we apply to statements about which we agree; but that is because, if we agree that
things are thus and so, we agree that it is true that things are thus and so. But we may agree that
things are thus and so when it is not true that things are thus and so. So "true" is not a word that
truly applies to all or only statements about which we agree; and neither, of course, does calling a
statement true mean that it is a statement we agree about.
Haack, Manifesto, supra n. 339, at 19 (emphasis in original).
It is, of course, desirable to be openminded and tolerant about words, ideas, and persuasion. When
being openminded and tolerant about words, ideas, and persuasion, however, it is not necessary to call them
"true." Only words, ideas, and persuasion that are true deserve to be called "true." Benson & Stangroom,
supra n. 9, at 166-67 (quoting and discussing Rorty and Haack on "truth"). It is not true that "black" is
"white." It is not true that "war" is "peace." It is not true that "intrastate" is "interstate." It is not true that
"trivial" is "substantial." And, it is not true that "noncommercial intercourse" is "commerce."
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